

INNOVATION, WORK, SOCIETY

ESTABLISHMENT OF BASIC APPROACHES
TOWARDS FOREIGN POLICY OF CANADA**Olesya Antokhiv-Skolozdra**

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Summary

The article deals with Canada's foreign policy conceptual orientations on the world arena. Historically, Canada's endeavor to define its position on both global and regional levels correlated with a number of factors, like the impact of the world super-powers, establishing international organizations (UN, NATO, OSCE), relations with the European countries in the realm of integrational processes on the European continent. The aim of the article is analysing basic principles of foreign policy formation in a post-war period and covering the main approaches: Continentalism, Europeanism and Internationalism.

Methods of research involve systemic and chronological approach in theoretical analysis based on transdisciplinary scholars' investigation.

The outcome of the research ensures multilateral approach towards realizing Canada's role in the world politics. Chronological analysis of transatlantic policy may result as follows: Canadian foreign policy effectively involves alternative external orientations, aimed at diversification of international relations, with the objective of its personal role as both neutral and active representative of international environment.

Key words: global politics, trade and economic cooperation, international organizations, national interests, defense system.

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1. Introduction

The debate over Canada's place in international relations has been in progress since the establishment of the state's Department of Foreign Affairs. Canada's international "ontology" is at the forefront of the domestic discussion, giving secondary importance to other, sometimes even more significant, issues of the world politics (*Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009*).

Some politicians are convinced that the affiliation with the North American continent is determinative in Canada's international political activity. According to the others, Canada's

behaviour on the international arena is due to its “medium power” status. In this context, the original approach was proposed by J. Bennett, pointing out that Canada is a part of the so-called “Anglosphere” – a separate “club of democracies” of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, whose position is strengthened by belonging to the “superpower”, namely the United States (Bennett, 2004).

Gradual strengthening of the Asia-Pacific region and the development of economic relations with Latin America prompted the justification of Canada’s “Asian vocation” on the one hand, or its affiliation with the Western Hemisphere, on the other (Caouette, 2009). Especially after the Canadian refusal to participate in the military intervention in Iraq, the agenda included the question of the extent to which the French civilizational heritage and relations with France, the opinion of Quebec’s people on international politics, affected the position of Canada on the whole (Haglund, 2005).

We can hardly agree on the existence of a homogeneous identity in Canada. Intellectuals, political powers, and public opinion hold different views of the international role of this state. Hence, they state that multilateralism is an integral part of Canada’s international policy. Therefore, it is inherent for it to support all international organizations, regardless of their nature: the NATO, the UN, OSCE and others. Similar concepts were highlighted in the works of Lester B. Pearson, Escott Reid, Dennis H. Wrong, Norman A. Roberston, which constituted the basis of Canada’s foreign policy in the post-war period.

However, in some cases, Canada is unable to take a multilateral approach, due to the situational controversies with its allies.

In this regard, it is worth focusing on the transatlantic component of Canada’s strategic culture. From a theoretical perspective, it is necessary to ponder over the homogeneity of Canada’s interests or identity on international arena. In order to demonstrate the contradictions that have always been characteristic of Canada’s foreign policy, it is necessary to analyze the place of Europe in the intellectual discussion of the politics of this country after the end of World War II. In particular, competitiveness among Continentalism, Europeanism and Internationalism deserves separate attention (Clark, 2016).

The issue of transatlantic relations cannot be considered separately from Canada’s relations with both the USA and European countries. After World War II, they were compared to a triangle, stating that Canada was inseparable from Great Britain as well as the United States. During this period, the United Kingdom was seen not only as the ancestor of all Canadian political institutions and the birthplace of most Canadians or their predecessors, but also as an important trade and military partner. Although within the flow of history, the UK happened to lose its superiority to the USA, today Europe and the UK continue to play an important role in the public consciousness of Canadians.

Thus, in the post-war period, Canadian political elites debated the feasibility of involving Canada in the defense of the European continent, the appropriateness of its support for the UN, or the need to focus on bilateral relations with the USA. However, no unequivocal answer was offered, as Canadians chose to remain in Europe within NATO, actively participated in UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations, and integrated their defense system with the Americans, including NORAD (Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009).

Thus, today, like over half century ago, Canadians make attempts to combine Continentalism, Europeanism and Internationalism, viewing it as implementation of Multilateralism in their foreign policy.

2. Continentalism

Continentalists are convinced that Canada's national interest is inseparable from interest of the USA. This is due to the fact that Washington remains Ottawa's main trading partner. Regardless of all attempts at the beginning of the 1970s to diversify market and nationalize the key economic sectors, Canada's dependence on the US proceeded rising. It refers not only to export, but also to the affiliation of enterprises and the level of American investment. Signing of Free Trade Bilateral Agreement in 1988 and North-American Free Trade Agreement in 1993 approved inevitability of integration of Canadian economy into continental processes and its dependence on market on the scale of the American continent: over 40 percent of Canada's GDP depends on it (*Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009; Sloan, 2019*).

After the events of 11 September that caused the temporary closure of US–Canada border, the Federal Government of Canada was forced to focus on mitigation of a situation. In order to ease the American uncertainty in the security sphere, a number of bilateral agreements was concluded to promote safety along the border (*Powell, 2020*).

The continentalists rebuked the liberal governments, particularly, P. E. Trudeau's (1968–1984) and J. Chrétien's (1993–2003), for endangering relations with the United States. Thus, the former Ambassador of Canada to the USA A. Gottlieb emphasized that the US–Canada friendship and the US support strengthened the global role of Canada, and any attempts of Canadians to counterbalance the dominant role of the USA on the international arena is inappropriate (*Gotlieb, 2005c*).

Canada's Continentalist foreign policy which, according to Gottlieb, is the best for the state, should meet three basic requirements: to recognize the primacy of transcendental American power; to cease trying to play the role of mediator or to assert itself as a "medium power"; to abandon the belief that the UN's decision is the only legitimate one. The worst-case scenario for Canada is to keep the attempts "to be different from the US just to be unlike them" (*Gotlieb, 2005c*).

Canada's refusal to participate in the US-sponsored multilateral coalition (under the auspices of the US) during the military intervention in Iraq provoked a sharp reaction from the continentalists. Hence, Canada's reluctance to act as an ally of the USA faced criticism. In particular, J. Granatstein characterized such decision as "short-sighted", because it endangered a key national interest – close relations with the USA. J. Granatstein also pointed out that Canada's focus on the role of the United Nations led to a disastrous decision by the government not to support the United States in the Security Council (*Granatstein, 2003*).

More moderate continentalists viewed the presence of Canadians in Afghanistan as a pledge of the US support for Canada, a kind of compensation for not participation in the Iraqi campaign (*Johnson, 2019; Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009; Robertson, 2019*).

Former Minister J. Manley noted the need for a more "conscious" approach, and the former head of the Canadian Prime Minister's Cabinet J. Chrétien expressed regret over "immature anti-Americanism". In their view, one should agree with the obvious fact: Canada's foreign policy begins with the foreign policy of the United States (*Hillmer, 2005*). Consequently, such visions should lead to a realistic policy towards Europe, because so far Canada's diplomatic engagement in the region has been excessive and irrational, not corresponding its national interests (*Burney, 2005*).

Nevertheless, the main focus is not on the cultural relation of Canada with its Southern neighbor, but on its geographical proximity and the economic consequences of bilateral relations. A. Gottlieb points out that the key requirement of a realistic foreign policy is the

recognition that the destiny of Canada as a nation state is interconnected with its geographical location. Therefore, some scholars consider the possibility of Canada's integration with the USA on the EU pattern, which would provide for the presence of joint commissions, a court, a currency unit, etc. However, the practical implementation of this "Big Idea", as determined by the Canadians themselves, is seen as a matter of the long-term perspective, and the preference is given to strengthening the North American project (*Barry, 2003*).

3. Europeanism

Another approach towards Canada's foreign policy dimension is represented by supporters of Europeanism, for whom relations with Europe (with the UK with France, and today entirely with the EU) are determinative to Canadian identity. It is exemplified with the fact that with the approval of 90% of the UN General Assembly resolutions, Canada shared common views with the EU (*Report, 2011*).

It should be admitted that the convergence of Canada's policy with the EU's position on important international issues is more common than that with the US. Here we should mention the International Criminal Court, the Ottawa Convention on the Ban of Anti-Personnel Landmines or the Kyoto Protocol (*Report, 2011*).

It should also be mentioned that Canada's Foreign policy was governed by the UK for quite a long period. Even in 1939 the decision to join the Allies was made two years ahead of the USA, and only eight years after the adoption of the Westminster Statute, which gave Canada the right to implement its foreign policy, was it adopted because of faithfulness to Great Britain. Meanwhile, propaganda convinced the French-Canadians that this step was done on the French call. Europeanisation at that time was a sign of devotion to the British Empire. But after World War II, a wider vision of Europeanisation started to be shaped, determined by the importance of transatlantic relations during the Cold War.

The most famous European Manifest is M. Sharp's publication called "Canada-US Relations: Options for the future". Its author, a supporter of P. Trudeau, currently a Foreign Minister of Canada, developed the concept of "the third alternative". Sharp focuses on three alternatives, considering the relationship between Ottawa and its Southern neighbour: maintaining the "status quo" in relations with the US; integration of Canada with the US; diversification of Canadian relations through wider cooperation with Europe and Japan. In his view, the third alternative is the most appropriate as it was created to reduce the vulnerability from the USA (*Sharp, 1972*). Its implementation was tried by the liberal Government of P. Trudeau and eventually, brought about the signing the Framework Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation with the European Community (1976).

In numerous views, the state, created by British loyalists with the significant participation of French-Canadians, has inherited a political culture that has never abandoned its European roots (*Lipset, 1990*). In 2003, M. Adams pointed out that in the aspect of religion, social equality, health and social security systems, Canadian values significantly differ to American ones (*Adams, 2003*). It gave grounds to assert that Canada has acquired more expressive European features (*Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009; Bratt, 2017; Kukucha, 2018*).

In 2007 the Canadian researcher J. Kirton noted that historically, the territory of Canada was conquered and colonized by Europeans. Demographically, the first colonizers came from Europe and Canada was settled not only by their descendants, but also experienced several waves of European migration. Geographically, Canada borders on three European countries – France (Saint Pierre and Miquelon), Denmark (Greenland), USA (Alaska). In the economic field,

Europe was Canada's first sales market and the first source of capital and technology, which contributed to its transformation into one of the leading industrialized countries in the world. Culturally, European values have a lot in common with Canadian ones. Through the prism of spirituality, Canada remains the political system and society of British North America (*Kirton, 2007*).

Therefore, it is appropriate to use the term transatlantic policy, because from Canadian perspectives, after the World War II the so-called transatlantic community took the place of Great Britain as a new opponent of the USA. Herein, the liberal government of L. St. Laurent (1948–1957) firmly defended the idea of the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Canadian diplomat E. Reid was among its developers and the initiator of the semantic content of Article 2. Therefore, Prime Minister L. St. Laurent and the current Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada L. B. Pearson were adherents of transatlantic policy (*Haglund, 2005*).

For Eurocentrists, Canada was one of the integral parts of the NATO triangle, uniting North America and Europe not only around common interests but also common civilizational foundations (*Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009; Harper, 2018; Robertson, 2019*). In this regard, the essayist J. Welsh pointed out: “We [the Canadians] like to see ourselves as a hybrid that has absorbed the best from Europe and the United States of America. Although we recognize the success of the American approach to doing business and their ability to protect their interests, we remain the Europeans in the regard of education, social projects and culture. Owing to these hybrid features, Canada's vocation is to act as a mediator between the two shores of the Atlantic” (*Welsh, 2004a*).

Thus, D. Long stated: “If we consider the economic aspects, it would be logical to integrate Canada into the American economy, but foreign policy is not just the economy. Canada's position and Canadian values are closer to European, or at least “in the middle” between the European and American visions” (*Long, 2003*).

However, only certain Canadian political elite are in favor of Canada's rapprochement with Europe. The former Canadian ambassador to Germany M. Bernard-Meunier states that North American integration is not inevitable, and when the approaches of Europeans and Americans on vital international issues do not coincide, the Canadian vision is closer to the European one (*Bernard-Meunier, 2006*).

Similar views were shared by the Prime Minister of Quebec, J. Charest, who initiated concluding a Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the EU. The Minister of Trade of Canada R. MacLaren, based on the provisions of the Framework Agreement (1976), in 1994 put forward the idea of a transatlantic Free Trade Zone. Following the failure of the Doha Round in negotiations, the issue of a Free Trade Agreement was again put on the agenda by Prime Minister S. Harper's Conservative Government under persistent pressure from the Quebec government and an initiative from Brussels (*Leblond and Olteanu-Strachinescu, 2009*).

4. Internationalism

The adherents of Internationalism believe that Canada should maintain its own position as a neutral mediator or an “honest broker”, taking actions mainly within the UN. Thus, S. Roussel and Ch. Robichaud pointed out that Canada's main goal is to promote peace and security in international relations. Therefore, it should pursue a policy shaped by functionalism, multilateralism and institutionalism. Canada should play an active, visionable and distinctive role in creating and ensuring functioning of the world order on the principles of democracy, human rights, social justice, free trade and the rule of law. It cannot be straited to North America and neglect everything that occurs in other parts of the world (*Roussel and Robichaud, 2004*).

Internationalist discourse was dominant in the Canadian Parliament for a long time. Likewise, it kept its leading position in the academic environment. According to this approach, Canada is viewed as a “medium power” capable of gaining certain benefits by transforming its relatively small, compared to superpowers, military and economic potential. Hence, by preserving a neutral yet active position and setting a positive example to follow, Canada can influence the course of global events (*Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009; Kukucha, 2018*).

During the Cold War, Internationalism was associated primarily with the work of Foreign Minister L. Pearson and was outstanding due to moderation of approaches considering the inter-bloc confrontation. Meanwhile, Canada sought to play the role of a “bridge” between the West and the East. Much attention was focused on helping developing countries and active participation in the UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations (*Kirton, 2007; Clark, 2016; Robertson, 2019*).

In the 1990s, Internationalism was embodied in a series of initiatives of Canadian Foreign Minister L. Axworthy, focusing on two key aspects: “human security” and “soft power”. In an effort to involve citizens and establish a dialogue with non-governmental organizations in political decision-making, preference was made to “open diplomacy” programs (*Lee, 2000*).

One of the last manifestos of Canadian Internationalism was the work of J. Welsh “At Home in the World” (2004). Thus, Welsh argued that Canadian foreign policy should “embody a liberal pluralistic democracy in which human rights are paramount. Canada should not strive to be a medium power, but a model power, an exemplary power “ (*Welsh, 2004a*). It can be summarized by the slogan “the world needs Canada more”.

The main idea of Welsh’s views is to reject considering the world in traditional categories of international relations: “enemy-ally”, “national interest”, negotiations “with zero amount” etc. It also provides for the involvement of regions such as Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, with a strong emphasis on trade, liberalism and human rights.

Former OECD Secretary, D. Johnston, described Canadian Internationalism as coherent with the Welsh’s approach: “I desire Canada to continue playing its post-war role: a fair mediator in international disputes and conflicts, a generator of ideas for improving the world governance; a country open to immigrants from all over the world who seek to realize themselves in a pluralistic democracy, where the living standard remains one of the highest” (*Johnson, 2014; Harper, 2018*).

Different Canadian governments were characterized mostly by a comprehensive approach to foreign policy (*Harper, 2018; Robertson, 2019*).

The Liberal Party, which remained in power for a long time, always took an ambivalent position. Obviously, the postwar governments of L. St. Laurent (1948–1957) and L. Pearson (1963–1968) both shared ideas close to Internationalism. This period is unequivocally defined as the “golden age” of Canadian diplomacy. This is primarily due to Canada’s active involvement in the UN and the gradual strengthening of the country’s role in international relations. The vivid evidence of devotion to Internationalism in Canadian foreign policy was the work of Foreign Secretary L. Pearson, who played a key role in creation of UN-sponsored peacekeeping force to resolve the Suez Crisis and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (1957). In the 1960s Canada became actively involved in numerous UN peacekeeping operations.

In order to counterbalance the Soviet threat, Canada actively participated in the elaboration of the North Atlantic Treaty. It was the first international agreement of military nature signed by Canada after World War II. Since 1951, Canada has deployed its military units on the European continent within NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty was a further evidence of its readiness to participate in European affairs (*Johnson, 2019*).

At the same time Canada proceeded approaching to the USA. Regardless the fact that the agreement on NORAD was signed by the government of J. Diefenbaker's conservators, its drafting was started by L. St. Lauren's liberal government. The vitality of relationships with the US was shown by liberal L. Pierson, who after taking the Prime Minister's chair in 1963, agreed for the location of American nuclear missiles on a territory of Canada with the view to providing security to North America from the USSR threat (*Clearwater, 1998*).

The J. Diefenbaker's conservative government (1957–1963) partially continued a diplomatic course, initiated by L. St. Lauren. Canada's affection to Internationalism policy was preserved via participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN. The feature of J. Diefenbaker's foreign policy was strengthening relations with the British Commonwealth, which could be deemed in the categories of "old Europeanism" (*Robinson, 1989*).

Moreover, the search of the third alternative by the P. Trudeau's government (1968–1984) witnessed European tendencies in the Liberal party. Relationships of Canada with the US were often quite complex, so the agreement with the European Community in 1976 was viewed as country's return to Europe. In reality, P. Trudeau began reconsidering foreign policy in order to subordinate its priorities to the Canada interests. Hence, Internationalism became of secondary importance (*Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009; Keenan and Chase, 2017*).

P. Trudeau's doctrine, set out in the White Papers on Canadian foreign policy (1969), was dedicated to protecting Canada's interests and relatively little attention was put to the international security issues (*Lyon, 1989*). Accordingly, P. Trudeau made attempts to alter Canada's defense policy, reducing Canadian contingent of NATO in Europe by half. In that way the defense policy of Canada was to focus on the defense of the state and the North America (*Maloney, 2005*).

Although Canada continued to diversify its relations outside the continent, primarily with Europe and Japan, its economic dependence on the US showed a steady growth, sharpening the clash between Continentalism and Europeanism (*Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009; Robertson, 2019*).

The Conservative government of B. Mulroney, which came to power in 1984, opted for continental integration. Initially, rapprochement and integration with the US became its foreign policy priorities. They abandoned traditional Conservative protectionism and signed the 1988 Canada–US Free Trade Agreement. Economic convergence thus provided impetus to closer cooperation in the field of energy security. In the defense sphere, due to the provisions of the 1987 White Paper, it was envisaged to deepen cooperation within NORAD (*Ripsman, 2001; Powell, 2020*). Subsequently, during the Persian War in the 1990s, Canada sided with the US for the first time since the Korean War. It joined the resumption of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere, as a full member of the Organization of American States in 1989.

Canada's participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations demonstrated the country's commitment to the legacy of Internationalism. While in the period from 1947 to 1986 Canada took part in 19 peacekeeping operations, in the period from 1987 to 1992 the country was involved in 18 UN operations, doubling the number of its troops (*Tessier and Fortmann, 2001*).

Under the influence of Canadian Foreign Minister D. Clark, the government of B. Mulroney participated in a number of multilateral international forums and thus, distanced itself from the American position on climate changes. At the same time, B. Mulroney's government showed no sign of goodwill towards rapprochement with Europe. Some evidences of resurgence of Internationalism in Canada's foreign policy was observed since the new Liberal government came to power, especially given that the Foreign Office was headed by L. Axworthy.

In particular, efforts to adopt the Anti-personnel Mine Convention, initiated by Canada, were a definite step forward in this regard. At the same time, Canada's positions converged with the European, especially on issues, such as climate changes, functioning of the International Criminal Court or signing the Kyoto Protocol. Although Canada sent its military contingent to Bosnia and Kosovo, it refused to participate in the intervention in Iraq (2003). This circumstance also serves as an acknowledgment of the convergence of Canadian approaches with the positions of the leading European states on important international policy issues.

On the other hand, it was the government of J. Chrétien's liberals that reduced Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN. He continued the economic integration with the United States initiated by the Conservatives. It's worth noticing, that such policy was actively criticized by the Liberals when they were in opposition (*Clark, 2016; Kukucha, 2018*).

Returning to Continentalism was in line with the situation that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and gave impulse to Canada's rapprochement with the United States. First of all, it concerned the question of protection of the common border and general strengthening of continental defense. Continentalism of J. Chretien's premiership was continued by his successor, P. Martin, who together with the presidents of the US and Mexico, launched the "Partnership for Security and Prosperity" (*Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009; Bratt, 2017; Harper, 2018*).

The political rhetoric of J. Chretien's and P. Martin's governments often did not correspond to the steps they took de-facto. Despite the fact that Canada refused to participate in the military intervention in Iraq, the Chretien government did not stop the process of strengthening security measures throughout the border and ensured a military presence in the Persian Gulf. Although Martin's government declined Canada's participation in the US missile defense system, they did send a Canadian military contingent to Afghanistan at the request of the US (*Johnson, 2019*).

5. Conclusions

Foreign policy decisions and approaches of the Canadian politicians between the period of 1949 and 2006 were often the reflections of the debate within the society and were caused by the need to adjust current discourse to political realities. In view of both political necessity and pragmatism, different approaches to foreign policy were proposed. All Canadian governments, without exception, pursued ambivalent policy, based on the country's historical traditions, geographical location and economic significance (*Mérand and Vandermoortele, 2009; Clark, 2016; Bratt, 2017; Kukucha, 2018*).

In accordance with a number of researchers, this ambiguity in Canada's foreign policy vanished under the Conservative rule, chaired by S. Harper. On entering the Office in 2006, Harper began to adherently defend the position of Continentalism and gave exceptional priority to Canada's relations with the USA. Thereby, he abandoned the policy of "equilibrium" carried out by his predecessors (*Clark, 2016, Robertson, 2019*).

As a result, Canada ceased practical implementation of the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. S. Harper's government increased spending on armament, took a clear pro-Israeli stance in the Middle East conflict and demonstrated sharp criticism towards Russia's annexion of Crimea and military intervention in the East of Ukraine.

In the new millennium Canadian foreign policy is based on the principle of "the rule of relations between Canada and the United States of America" (*Gotlieb, 2003a; Sloan, 2019*).

According to this concept, all Canada's foreign policy issues and initiatives should be viewed through the prism of US–Canadian relations.

A. Gotlieb insists that the best period in Canadian foreign policy was when Ottawa and Washington maintained close relations. It is the trust that Canada has in the US that made it possible, through its bilateral relations, to gain greater influence outside North America (Harper, 2018; Robertson, 2019; Powell, 2020).

As it has been mentioned, the main factor that determined the relationship between the USA and Canada after the events of 11 September 2001, was security (Welsh, 2004b; Johnson, 2019). A. Gotlieb claimed that he favoured a bilateral “Big Deal” which would create a framework for a comprehensive regulation of relations between the two states.

A similar position was taken by M. Hart, who negotiated a Free Trade Area Agreement with the United States. Since the USA is Canada's largest trading partner, its relationship with this state should be a dominant factor in Canadian foreign policy (Hart, 2003). The same ideas were shared by the Canadian speaker at the negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. As early as the 1970s, R. Grey said: “If a small country sprays its negotiating efforts mainly on foreign policy issues, it may not be able to have the resources or means to protect its own commercial interests” (Hart, 2003). In Other words, the implementation of the concept of “soft power” with a positive image among Canadians is in fact a disincentive to pursue genuine Canadian interests (Bratt, 2017; Powell, 2020).

With the regard to a number of scholars, Canada's dependence on the American market is a proved fact. Researchers claim that this dependence has only got deeper with the Agreement on a Free Trade Area (1988) and NAFTA (1993) (the North American Free Trade Agreement). However, the real performances have overcome the most ambitious plans. Furthermore, export to the USA almost doubled as a part of GDP in Canada from 18.6% to 37.6%. In general, 80% of Canadian exports was directed to the USA. Such rapid growth in trade, given the functioning of the FTA and NAFTA, led to a reorientation of “the Canadian geo-economic vector [of development] from the traditional East-West to the North-South axis” (Courchene, 2003; Keenan and Chase, 2017; Sloan, 2019; Powell, 2020).

Nevertheless, the realities of political life are multifaced, and the aspiration of the Canadian people are more differentiated. One of the famous Canadian researchers, J. Holmes, on the “economization” of foreign policy, noted: “no state can survive if it limits its relations only to the country with which it has the greatest trade” (Holmes, 1976; Bratt, 2017; Harper, 2018).

The global situation has changed drastically since September 11, 2001, when new security challenges faced the international community. There is a need for Canada “... to do more than sell and buy. It should be involved in creating new rules and new structures to address global challenges” (Welsh, 2004b; Robertson, 2019).

A number of factors can be singled out that encourage Canada to go beyond Contintentalism in foreign policy. Firstly, this is the state's geographical location and the gigantic length of the coastline, which, on the one hand, isolates Canada from the rest of the world, and on the other, makes it vulnerable. Hereinto, the presence of a single and powerful neighbor – the United States, testifies in favor of Canada's development of a wide network of international relations. Secondly, Canada's impressive economic growth has recently turned it into an important member of the G7 and a potential donor of international initiatives.

In addition, there are a number of other reasons why Canada should strive to play a global role. In particular, this is its policy in the field of immigration and refugee affairs, as well as the peculiarities of the formation of the ethnic composition of the population. Canadian history and national identity are also important. The conclusion is that Internationalism

is firmly rooted in Canadian identity. Examples of the country's former international activities like peacekeeping operations and multilateralism are a source of constant pride for Canadian citizens. Therefore, they are inclined to support their own government in providing foreign aid to developing countries and regions, advocating an increase in Canada's presence in the UN, and also for expanding Canada's participation in international trade and economic agreements.

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