SPECIFICITY OF IDENTIFICATION PRACTICES
IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR AND ECOCIDE

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Summary

The Russian-Ukrainian war has significantly impacted the national self-identification of Ukrainians. The purpose of this research is to examine the issues of national self-identification among Ukrainians in the conditions of war. The article explores how the ongoing war has influenced the national self-identification of Ukrainians, the challenges they face in preserving their national identity, and the factors contributing to the change in national self-identification in the context of war.

The article focuses on analyzing the war in Ukraine as a manifestation of genocide and ecocide. The authors examine the complex aspects of the conflict, starting from its social and political roots to the environmental consequences on the natural surroundings. The article explores crimes against humanity and ecosystems, using the example of the war in Ukraine. The application of the terms "genocide" and "ecocide" is emphasized in the context of the war in Ukraine. The authors analyze an attempt to broaden the understanding of the negative consequences of war at the national heritage and environmental levels. The presented arguments and conclusions contribute to understanding the profound impact of war on society and ecosystems and may serve as a foundation for further humanitarian research in defining and qualifying such situations as genocide and ecocide.

Special attention in the article is devoted to the transformation of contemporary European values and the challenges of shaping humanitarian and national security.

Key words: identity, stability, trust, values, security, culture, education, security.

1. Introduction

In the contemporary world, where geopolitical conflicts and sociocultural changes too often define the dynamics of society, issues of national identity become extremely relevant. Historical events, such as the Russian-Ukrainian war, inevitably influence the self-awareness of citizens and the formation of their national identity. In this context, there arises a necessity for in-depth analysis and understanding of how war impacts national self-identification. This article is aimed at examining crucial aspects of the national identity issue, especially in the context of contemporary challenges and the influence of armed conflict on this process.

2. Ukrainian society

Today, the world is witnessing dramatic and profound political and social transformations/deformations in Europe related to the war in Ukraine.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is the largest war in Europe since the Balkan wars in the 1990s. Conservative estimates suggest there were at least 82,200 conflict-related deaths in Ukraine in 2022, although the true number is likely to be much higher *(GPI, 2023: 5)*.

The existential war between Ukraine and Russia has brought new impulses to life, which are reflected in philosophical concepts and categories.

These circumstances actualize such impulses-categories as identity, stability, trust, values.

The issue of identity has always been quite moving for Ukrainians. The understanding of own identity occurs through the association of like-minded people according to a certain criterion (including physical nature) or idea. In the conditions of the "axial time" of the country, milestone periods, identity understanding developed within the questions "Who are we?"/"What are we like?" and "Who are we with?".

The war has changed/updated the view of Ukrainians on themselves and formed an accurate and affirmative answer to the question "Who are we?"/"What are we like?" – "We are not ruzzkie".

It was in the search for fundamental existential differences that the Ukrainian unity (as a quality) and community (as an association) were mobilized.

To paraphrase the words of the famous French ethicist A. Badiou, who observed that there can be no "general" ethics, but only the ethics of individual truths that relates to a particular situation, and the concept of a situation here should play a significant role, and we assert that there is an absolute distinctive national identity: we are not them. In the preface to the English edition of the book, the author states "I was then obligated to admit that the event opens a subjective space in which not only the progressive and truthful subjective figure of fidelity but also other figures every bit as innovative, albeit negative – such as the reactive figure, or the figure I call the 'obscure subject' – take their place" *(Badiou, 2001:lvii)*.

"We are not them, not ruzzkie" is a well-formed and conscious vision, reinforced by explosions, enemy offensives and destruction since February 24, 2022 up to now. "We are not them, not ruzzkie" is an emotion for crimes against Ukrainians in Bucha, Irpen, Borodyanka. "We are not them, not ruzzkie" is the perception of the native land after the explosion of the Kakhovka Dam.

"We are not them" was our response to those who committed genocide and ecocide on our land – when the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian lands are destroyed, the possibility of physical existence on this land is destroyed – mining, destruction, and environmental pollution.

The answer to the question "What are we like?" updated the search for people similar in aspirations, values, and qualities, both within and outside the community itself.

3. Challenges of profound identity

Let us mention a few theses about the search for identity within the community itself. It is appropriate to describe it as an "internal" or *"deep" identity* (<u>author's term</u>).

In the fourth chapter, "Ethics as decomposed (decomposee) religion," A. Badiou writes about identity which is defined as "respect for differences" and the ethics of human rights, so there can be no respect for those whose difference consists precisely in not respecting differences. "I am another", that is the difference and the French thinker emphasizes:

"It might well be that ethical ideology, detached from the religious teachings which at least conferred upon it the fullness of a 'revealed' identity, is simply the final imperative of a conquering civilization: 'Become like me and I will respect your difference" *(Badiou, 2001: 24–25)*.

Deep identity can manifest itself through the categories of "resilience", "solidarity", "trust". Deep identification is preceded by a modern understanding of the nation as a free and conscious choice, this is facilitated by the category of "citizenship".

Identification as a community with citizenship is of both a formal and motivational nature. The possibility of free choice of citizenship is in the context of understanding of common goals and values. The share of Ukrainians men and Ukrainian women identifying themselves primarily as a citizen of Ukraine ranges from 72% to 85%, depending on the methodology and time of surveys conducted *(Sudyn, 2022)*. This historical maximum gives grounds to consider the categories of "solidarity", "sustainability" and "trust" as leading factors for identification.

Historical discourse in the recent Ukrainian past allows us to assume that it is war (as well as other social upheavals) that is the trigger of unity for self-identification. Such a surge was observed in 2004 during the Orange Revolution and in 2014 during the Revolution of dignity. From the height of today's events, it is worth noting that it is three events: 2004, 2014 and 2022 that contribute to the formation of the Ukrainian nation as having its own conscious identity (as a community) and that is why it is ready to form, defend, and realize the Ukrainian statehood, which is the subject of our identity.

On June 29, 2023, the results of a national sociological survey conducted by the Razumkov Center on May 23–31, 2023 were presented on the air of the press conference "Identity of Ukrainian citizens: state and dynamics of changes". The study showed key indicators of the effectiveness of state policy implementation in the field of establishing Ukrainian national and civil identity *(Razumkov Center, 2023)*.

2020 respondents aged 18 and over were surveyed. The results of the survey were compared with the data from previous studies conducted by the Razumkov Center Sociological Service since 2000.

According to the survey, the European Union was associated mainly with progress and development – 84.4% (May 2023) against 76.3% in December 2017; Russia was associated with backwardness and regression with 83.1% (May 2023) against 50.6% in December 2017, and Russia's association with progress and development fell to 3.1% in May 2023 from 16.2% in December 2017.

The analytical report of the Kyiv International Sociological Institute entitled "Historical Memory" dated March 20, 2023, reflects the opinions and views of Ukrainian residents on the perception of history and the idea of historical figures and events. The tables show a significant interest in the history of Ukraine over the past 10 years and the last year (2023) in all age categories of respondents *(Istorychna pamiat, 2023: 9)*.

Questions related to individual historical figures and events were interesting in the context of understanding national identity and feeling involved in the process of historical change. First, it should be noted on the personalities mentioned in the survey. The names Brezhnev, Khrushchev, Peter the Great, Catherine the Second, Lenin, and Stalin fluctuated within 3.1% in the answer "This person is unfamiliar", which, in our opinion, is an articulation of the certainty of the role of the figure in the formation of the history of Ukraine. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Danylo Galytsky, Yaroslav the Wise, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Bohdan Khmelnitsky, Levko Lukyanenko, Pavel Skoropadsky, Ivan Mazepa, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, Symon Petliura, Nestor Makhno are the figures familiar to the respondents. Unfortunately, 44% failed to know Elena Teliga and 34% – Andrii Sheptytsky respectively *(Istorychna pamiat, 2023: 3–16)*.

The uprising of Bohdan Khmelnytsky – 83%, The Revolution of Dignity – 84%, the uprising of Ivan Mazepa – 74%, the collapse of the USSR – 83%, the creation of the UUN – 75%, the existence of the UPR and liberation competitions of the 20s of the twentieth century – 68%, the struggle of the UUN – UPA – 68%, the Orange Revolution – 70%, the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR – 70%, respectively had a positive role in the history of Ukraine, according to respondents. This percentage convincingly indicates the formation of a modern context for understanding the nation's formation and its history, where the issues of forming and asserting independence are of primary importance *(Istorychna pamiat, 2023: 21).*

4. Common values

In our opinion, deep identification will be implemented precisely based on conscious common values. In peacetime, peaceful values are formed, and this requires time and selection. Under was conditions the values are determined spontaneously. Thus, the value is "security", "community" as an opportunity to be together, and so on. If we recall the philosophy of the French Enlightenment, the "social agreement" is necessary for the sake of ensuring security, but when the state cannot guarantee the latter and becomes a source of threat, then people must protect themselves by guaranteeing themselves the most important rights, and for this, not only security but also freedom become necessary. As you know, the new European understanding of security is formed in the philosophical concept of Hegel, who emphasizes that a person's habit of security becomes his other nature. Understanding security as one of the main values that ensures the life of a person and the development of his civilization, culture, the expansion of the semantic boundaries of the concept of "security" can include "peace", "harmony", "stability", "silence", "joy", "confidence", "peace", "security" and the like. The method of verbalizing the idea of security actualizes the protection of the national security of Ukraine in the form of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which is the basis for both confrontation in the current war and the preservation of national identity.

Language and discourse play an important role in shaping both domestic and European safety cultures. Language, constructing social reality, structures the text, a picture of the world in which the language functions as an information code that makes it possible to get an idea of the thinking of people who speak this language. Language, so to speak, protects its own cultural space. Let us remember M. Foucault in "The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language" moves from understanding the discourse as a chain of reasoning to interpreting discourse as a way to obtain such reasoning (knowledge), and then to the practice of obtaining knowledge. In his concept, discourse is a social practice *(Foucault, 1972: 32–33)*. Hence, a discourse is interpreted as a text in context, as an event, a purposeful speech is added, and we have a discourse as a result as a speech immersed in life.

Land is Ukrainian landscapes and freedom. Ukrainians also refer to both in the understanding of property, the understanding of management, and the understanding of territory to the category of land as defining values. Land as a value is genetically perceived by Ukrainians. Therefore, since the beginning of the war in 2014 and until now, land as a value has become even more significant for us, Ukrainians. The value of land for Ukrainians is an archetype and is closely intertwined with the will. And the will is the basis of the national character.

It was the Ukrainian land that, through its properties of fertile chernozem, formed the features of individualism, so inherent in Ukrainians. If there was a part of the land that was cultivated and formed a product, the Ukrainian could exist independently of the collective, that

is, freely. Over time, when there was an increase from an ethnic group to a nation, the question of ownership or owning land arises.

Private land at an individual level becomes property, and then at a social level: my land is my country.

During the aggressive nature of the war in Ukraine, when the Ukrainian lands were occupied, the understanding of land as a value only sharpened and developed and found its manifestation in the belief in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, returning their land in the physical dimension.

The problem of ecocide is also connected with the understanding of land as a value. The following connection seems logical – the destruction of the land of Ukrainians as a place of their formation as a nation, as a genetic connection leads to the disappearance of the Ukrainian nation. From ecocide to genocide.

5. From ecocide to genocide

Ecocide is when kill the house. Kherson watermelons. Melitopol sweet-cherry. Kherson steppes. Cherry orchards. Transcarpathian cheese. The mentioned above is a manifestation of the indissoluble connection of the Ukrainian land with the Ukrainian nation. The pain that Ukrainians feel from the loss is the pain of the death of "their relative". They do not miss a stranger, the latter does not cause strong emotions that can mobilize.

The national mentality of Ukraine is characterized by the principle of mercy, which has always been widespread in the public consciousness. After all, the fundamental principles of the national mentality are connected with history: the more difficult trials the people have experienced, the more compassion and mutual respect are developed at the level of mass consciousness.

The war has made the external boundaries of Ukrainian identity more tangible "If we are not like the enemies, and we are not with them, then who are we with?". Thus, the search for an externally oriented community takes place. According to sociologists, the European identity of Ukrainians has increased from 3.6 points to 6.4 points (0 means that a person does not feel European at all, and 10 means that a person is European). In the search for European identification, a civilizational choice is hidden, between barbarism and culture. Barbarism is represented by aggressiveness, war, and disregard for the value of an individual life. Migration policy during the war and the ability to adapt to new conditions with European values and rules also significantly influenced the desire of Ukrainians to identify themselves as a European nation. In addition, the exit of the identification problem from the format "Who are we?" and moving to the format "Who are we with?" significantly specifies and modernizes the Ukrainian national idea.

Why is it so important for Ukrainians to understand and form the concept of "Who are we with"? Let us assume that such awareness will strengthen the imaginary war outpost. For Ukraine, it is the choice of the path of culture and light. The war, which has a local character in the imagination of the world, has a global character and significance for the world. It is the military actions in Ukraine that exacerbate the economic, environmental, energy, and even ideological and spiritual dimensions of the complex global crisis.

There is no optimistic "end of history" (according to F. Fukuyama) with a positive meaning. As a result, there is a risk of using nuclear weapons, uncontrolled chain of military conflicts, political disputes, and so on.

In the context of the European identity of Ukrainians, it is worth focusing on the category of "solidarity". Solidarity implies both common actions (for example, a mandatory donation to the army) and thoughts (the slogan "Ukraine is above all!"). In understanding and perceiving solidarity, visualization elements of external attributes are important. Such approaches can be understood as manifestations and implantation in the processes of identifying mass culture. But for us, the colors of the national flag are important in the identification process, national clothing (for Ukrainians it is vyshyvanka) is recognized by these signs as our own. And it is these symbols that are destroyed by enemies. Solidarity at the request of time takes on new forms and manifestations. The goal of solidarity is to combine deep identification with external identity.

Solidarity creates an interesting phenomenon that is an increase in trust in each other ("we", "of one's own kind"), a decrease in the level of social cynicism. Cynicism is a rather problematic phenomenon with the ability to destroy a social organism.

One of the manifestations of solidarity in the conditions of war is that differences among the Ukrainian community itself may disappear. For example, before the Great War, a certain part of Ukrainians had a fairly tolerant attitude towards Russia. This, by the way, was presented as a justification for acts of aggression among Russians. The war practically leveled such views. And people who did not think about their national identity asked this question for themselves.

Ukrainian publicist Vitaliy Portnikov notes that nothing unites people so much as the prospect of common death, the possibility of National defeat, or, conversely, a common victory. Such processes make it possible to include other ethnic groups in the circle of Ukrainian identity, which, while preserving their ethnic identity, choose Ukrainian identity as their national one.

6. European values

The identification definition, the trigger of which is war, makes actual the appeal to the search for new common values. The question of changing (or replacing) values has received a broad philosophical discussion. After all, attractive values like life, law, and equality were severely destroyed in Ukraine with the outbreak of war. What can replace or transform existing and known values?

For example, the category of "solidarity", which we have defined as a sign of identity, can claim value. The preservation of life can be transformed as the preservation of the life of the country, as the living conditions of every citizen.

It is important to emphasize that the problem of identification is also related to propaganda technology. The purpose of internal propaganda can be to preserve and establish national integrity and values. External propaganda is aimed at shifting community and solidarity.

Today, Russian propaganda in a certain sense forms our language discourse and plays, so to speak, "in its gate". The war has changed and continues to change the semiotic component of the world picture, which is traced and outlined in the language modification. Instead of the word "war", the Russian Federation offers the phrase/abbreviation "SMO", instead of "explosion" – "khlopok" (Rus.), Russian media continue to broadcast "on Ukraine", instead of "in Ukraine", these are syntactic and grammatical changes.

"In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of the atom bombs on Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments that are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the professed aims of political

parties. Thus, political language has to consist largely of euphemism, question–begging, and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenseless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine–gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable elements. Such phraseology is needed if one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures of them", – well-known words by Orwell *(Orwell, 2013)*, that are written in a scientific work "Politics and the English Language" and published by Britain's Horizon in 1946. The appeal to the double meaning of neutral words or euphemisms remains relevant today in the modern world.

The preposition "in" in this case on behalf of the Russian Federation changes the status of the territory (as they believe) to the status of a political subject, an active political subject. We record a spelling change to write proper names with a small letter – russia, putin, the names of politicians or officials (solovyov, lavrov, simonyan), and so on. And if for us it is a form of contempt, a clearly emphasized attitude towards the enemy, then, on the part of the citizens of the Russian Federation themselves, such writing is also acceptable and also emphasizes the attitude towards the authorities, presenting a kind of form of internal resistance. Or, for example, the appearance of the words "mogilization" (mobilization), "mobics" (mobilized), fertilizers (killed), and so on.

Language is a set of signs to create new meanings and images in their use. The use of euphemisms or neutral words undoubtedly has corresponding consequences in shaping the image of reality, which is constructed by the official Russian media.

They are not talking about the "conquer" of our territory but about their "liberation", not "refugees from Donbas", but "compatriots", respectively, playing with connotation has its consequences. "Conquer" sounds aggressive, "liberation" has a positive impression and therefore the non-active political space formed by the aggressor state on its territory creates the illusion of inactivity, although, in fact, the society internally (not demonstratively) rebels against the current government.

Without claiming the depth and consistency of the description, we will organize some language matches in the form of a table 1.

Table 1

word	euphemism
war	SMO / special military operation
explosion	khlopok (Rus.) – explosion
hobbies	liberation
battlefield	contact line
refugees	compatriots
restrictions on currency issuance	special issue procedure
dysphemisms	
AFU	national battalion, skills, fascists
the Ukrainian government	nazi junta/ unfriendly state
language Ombudsman	sprechenfuhrer
mobilized	mobik
defender of "Azov"	killer, militant of "Azov"

Table 1 (continuance)

mobilization	mogilizatsiya
migrants	relocants
killed	two hundredth
wounded	three hundredth
fraternal peoples	non-fraternal peoples / enemies

There is a certain ban on mentioning the duration of the war in Russian media, and our information channels put it in the first line, for example, the publication "Ukrainska Pravda" (Ukrainian Truth) reports the line "War in Ukraine. Total estimated losses of the enemy on a certain day."

Euphemisms reduce the level of anxiety and if we are talking about the reality of Russian society, which they hear from the radio and television, then the reality is rich in neutral words that do not cause indignation, anger, or anxiety. Accordingly, the main function of propaganda is to calm down and broadcast the usual way of life, which is not interrupted.

Euphemisms are usually used to prevent direct access to topics that may be, for example, negative. A euphemism that is built to avoid certain connotations forms connotations itself.

It is interesting, for example, to pay attention to the Instagram profile of blogger Mikael Khachibabyan, who has 150K+ on YouTube and 440k+ on the TikTok platform and, often communicating with Russians, provokes them to certain actions related to the rejection of war, taking advantage of the ignorance of the latter (for example, to sing a song about two hundredths).

In this context, the concepts of B should be mentioned. Lee Whorf and E. Sapir, whose names are combined in the name of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, where the idea that the structure of the native language affects thinking, perception, and memory, leads to a discrepancy between cognitive styles and worldviews.

Questions of information, genocide, language, violence, discord, etc. are as significant as possible in the context of modern events, but their transformation into platitudes and routine demonstrates a discursive political structure that affects mental models and social representations. Contextual control extends to the entire communication process, thereby turning into control over consciousness and control over thinking. An ontological configuration activated by text can be affected using a scheme:

past_____ future
here, now I/we

On this spatial coordinate, it is possible to represent certain objects that are far from the self/we. Here the point is not where and who is located, but that we ourselves can place interested objects on this scale as index signs, which are neutral words of dysphemism. The social distance formed in this way marks the boundaries of "the one of own kind" and "stranger". In other words, the "I" war (SMO, Operation), capture (liberation), etc., can move relative to the set goal. Accordingly, the propaganda machine of the Russian Federation radically changes epistemic truth and epistemicity as the puppeteer moves the puppet.

Back in 2015, analyzing the propaganda of Putin's Russia against Ukraine, S. Datsyuk noted that the information war is aimed at both a conceptual war, a war for mass consciousness, and a semantic war, defining a conceptual war for meanings and prospects of the future. The fundamental goal of semantic war is to create new discourses and, accordingly, semantic war is a war of discourses at the level of thinking attitudes and the new discourse that is established is a victory for the thinking attitude *(Datsiuk, 2015).*

The basis of the modern constitutional war is an attempt to reformat social, domestic national identification. The semantic war was likely launched several decades ago, as it continues to emphasize the non-existence of Ukrainian history, the Ukrainian language, and so on. For example, during the year of a full-scale war, 1,332 objects were destroyed cultural infrastructure: theaters, philharmonic halls, museums, galleries, libraries, clubs. More than a third of them were destroyed. As of June 25, 2023, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy recorded damage to 664 cultural heritage sites, including 211 architectural monuments, 179 historical monuments, and 16 archaeological monuments. Among the damaged ones:

St. Nicholas Church built in 1797 in Bakhmut;

the old building of the Orekhovsky Museum of Local Lore was built in 1893;

Bohdan and Varvara Khanenko Museum, built in 1887–1891 in Kyiv;

St. George's Church in the village of Zavorichi, Kyiv region;

"Slovo" house in Kharkiv;

Church of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross built in 1771 in the village of Berezdivtsy, Lviv region;

Arkhip Kuindzhi Art Museum in Mariupol;

100-year-old Lysychansk gymnasium *(Suspilne. Kultura, 2023)*.

In the city of Oleshki, the water from the Kharkiv Dam flooded the House of artist Polina Raiko, a representative of naive art, whose work art historians put on a par with the art of Kateryna Bilokur and Maria Primachenko.

During the occupation, the Russians emptied the funds of the Oleksii Shovkunenko, Kherson Art Museum, the Kherson Regional Museum of Local Lore, and the Albert Gavdzinsky Art Gallery in Nova Kakhovka. Collections of iconographies of the 17th and 20th centuries, Ukrainian paintings of the 19th and 20th centuries, in particular, 297 works of painting and graphics by Gavdzinsky, and works by contemporary artists were taken to the occupied Crimea. Some of the stolen paintings were on display at the Central Museum of Tavryda in Simferopol.

At the end of April 2022, the Russian military mined the territory near the stone grave (near Melitopol) – a unique monument of geology and archeology of world significance, the only place in all of Eastern Europe where rock paintings from the late Paleolithic to the Middle Ages have been preserved. The attraction is located on the territory of the reserve of the same name near Melitopol.

On the night of May 7, 2022, Russian gunners targeted a museum in the village of Skovorodynivka, Zolochiv community, Kharkiv region. The fire severely damaged the House of Andrii Kovalevsky, where the philosopher was staying. The destroyed building was not only a museum but also an architectural monument of the 18th century.

During the Russian offensive on Kyiv in February 2022, the Ivankiv Museum, which contained more than two dozen works by the world-famous artist, representative of "naive art" Maria Prymachenko, came under enemy artillery fire and was destroyed. Part of the collection was already in Kyiv at that time, and part was rescued from the burning museum by residents.

The wooden church on Zhitormishchina built in 1862 and survived two world wars was destroyed by Russian artillery fire in early March 2022 *(Ukrinform, 2023)*.

Unfortunately, this list is being supplemented with new crimes. The so-called "cultural" war is not only a kind of semantic war and the deliberate destruction of architectural monuments but is a serious problem of cultural *borrowings*, which the Russian Federation focuses on in its attempts to highlight the civilizational meaning of its own history. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict фіксує Definition of cultural property and undertake to respect the cultural property (Article 4 – Respect for cultural

property, pos.1) "by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict"; "further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property"; "shall refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural property" (Article 4, pos. 3).

And the problem of identity is considered so differently in Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, by Francis Fukuyama or The Lies That Bind. Rethinking Identity: Creed, Color, Class, cuisine by Kwame Anthony Appiah in the modern confrontation between Ukraine and the Russian Federation takes on its other discursive field. For example, Fukuyama delves into wide-ranging philosophy: the early Greek distinction between isothymia (the demand to be respected on an equal basis by other people) and megalothymia (the desire to be recognized as superior), Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Marx, Hegel, Luther, Weber, Kant, Nietzsche. Fukuyama discusses the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan in Ukraine, and especially the Arab Spring, as potential democratization movements, yet wonders whether "real-world liberal democracies never fully live up to their underlying ideals of freedom and equality, as rights are often violated" *(Fukuyama, 2018: 48)*. Given the central theme of the book – identity – Fukuyama theorizes about shifting identities. He explains, "National identity begins with a shared belief in the legitimacy of the country's political system, whether that system is democratic or not" *(Fukuyama, 2018: 12)*. He outlines several reasons why an inclusive sense of national identity remains critical for the maintenance of a successful modern political order: first, physical security; second, good government; third, facilitating economic development; fourth, promoting a wide radius of trust; fifth, maintaining strong safety nets that mitigate economic inequality; and sixth, making possible liberal democracy itself *(Fukuyama, 2018: 28–13)*. National identities have been created by four main paths: first, to transfer populations across the political boundaries of a particular country; second, to move borders to fit existing linguistic or cultural populations; third, to assimilate minority populations into the culture of an existing ethnic or linguistic group; and fourth, to reshape national identity to fit the existing characteristics of the society in question *(Fukuyama, 2018: 140–141)*.

Each of the authors offers his own understanding of identity, based on and analyzing, first of all, his own version of Culture, each understands the concept of "independence" differently and builds a path for its awareness. But identity is inevitable. Either it will be established as a political or as a manifestation of historical memory, or as a negative social reaction to racism and homophobia, or it will be "the sexist response experienced by middle-class white women". The world is considerably different. But the deep identification which we emphasize, first of all, overcomes *cultural borrowing* and it asserts the ideological dimension of the national cultural heritage, which finds its manifestation not only in the events of the past, but also in the understanding of oneself here and now in coordination with the future. The actions of the Russian Federation to destroy the value component of national culture are evidenced not only by cultural and social genocide, but also by the destruction of the international system for the protection of cultural monuments' during conflicts.

7. Self-awareness of Ukrainians. Category "sustainability"

"Why should Ukrainians be together? What is Ukraine?" – such provocative questions were asked by the Ukrainian philosopher Serhiy Datsiuk. He sees the essence of Ukraine only in the political plane, separated from other processes, and formulates it as the ability to

subjectivity, the ability to change (in conditions of self-preservation) in response to the challenges of time and conditions. In other words, the idea is put forward that it is positive (deep and external) identification that can form the basis for creating a sovereign socially oriented technologically developed country. It is worth noting that this optimistic thesis is further revealed in a negative-pessimistic context, but this is not the subject of our consideration right now. In this thesis, identification appears as a super-ethnic phenomenon that is consonant with the modern understanding of the nation as a community in favor of which a conscious and free choice is made *(Datsiuk, 2015)*. However, Serhii Datsiuk himself opposes the nation as a historical form of consolidation of large groups of people.

Datsiuk is opposed by Ukrainian philosopher Olexander Shmorgun and historian Yaroslav Hrytsak. They introduce the category of "sustainability" to understand the identification community, which means not only the ability to survive in difficult conditions but also to preserve the cultural potential and humanistic foundations of the worldview achieved over millennia of existence.

World history can also be viewed from the angle of nation-building through unification based on common interests or values. It is values that act as "spiritual motivators that serve to maximize the activation and mobilization of the community, its focus on solving the most important tasks that they face by non-standard methods*" (Shmorgun, 2023)* Yaroslav Hrytsak in his speech "Save Yourself and Save the Whole of Humanity", delivered at the conference "Sustainability: UA" on April 24, 2023 at the Ukrainian Catholic University concludes that "Ukraine is a nation, and we must be together to preserve the nation" *(Hrytsak, 2023)*.

8. State institutions during the war. Volunteering

Such a conclusion of both the report and the throwing processes in Ukrainian society, the picture of changes would be positive: solidarity, cohesion around values, awareness of one's own identity. But there is also the level of institutions. War is still a crisis that reveals threats to the values on which society rests, and, accordingly, to the institutions that protect and support these values. In sociology, the concept of crisis contains several elements:

1) the existence of problems that threaten the existence of society,
2) public awareness of these problems,
3) also search for institutions that would overcome existing problems and prevent their occurrence in the future.

Two points are important: first, society is aware of the existence of problems and, second, institutions that either need to be improved or created "from scratch". The latter is rather important because we are talking about creating stable mechanisms for solving problems or preventing them.

In this context, a survey conducted by the Razumkov Center touched upon the question of marking up the state symbols of Ukraine and attributes of an independent state.

Accordingly, compared to previous years, the share of those who are proud of the state symbols of Ukraine has increased: the flag of Ukraine (from 26% in 2011 to 75% in 2023), the coat of arms of Ukraine (from 25% to 74%), its anthem (from 22.5% to 69%). Also, the share of those who are proud of the state language of Ukraine increased from 32% to 74%, and the share of those who are proud of its monetary unit (Hryvnia) increased from 19% to 57%.

Most residents of all regions are proud of the flag of Ukraine (from 84% in the west of the country to 66% in the East), the coat of arms of Ukraine – from 82% in the west of the

country to 67% in the East, the anthem – from 80% in the west of the country to 56.5% in the East), the state language of Ukraine – from 86% in the west of the country to 64% in the East), its monetary unit – from 69% in the west of the country to 43.5% in the South.

Representatives of younger age groups are more likely than representatives of older age groups to be proud of the state symbols of Ukraine and the attributes of an independent state. Thus, 80% of respondents under the age of 30 and 69% of those who are 60 or more are proud of the flag of Ukraine, 79% and 68% are proud of the coat of arms of Ukraine, 78% and 62% are proud of the National Anthem, 81% and 67% are proud of the state language of Ukraine, and 65% and 51.5% are proud of its currency, respectively.

In August 2023, data from a survey conducted on the eve of Independence Day were published. The absolute majority of Ukrainians – 88,5% – are proud of their citizenship. These conclusions were reached by sociologists of the Ilka Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation *(Fond demokratychnykh initsiatyv, 2023)*. This is the highest figure for all the years of independence, sociologists say. "If in the 2000s there were about half of those who would strongly support the independence of Ukraine, after the Russian aggression in 2014, these figures increased to about 65–70%, then now it is more than 80%" – said Serhii Shapovalov, senior analyst at the Democratic Initiatives Foundation *(Detector media, 2023)*.

For example, volunteering and cash donations now partially "cover" those tasks that existing institutions are unable to perform. Approximately 35–37% of Ukrainians and Ukrainian women are involved in volunteer activities. However, only 4% do it constantly, and 33% – from time to time. This means that the volunteer movement is not sustainable. That is why the third component of crisis management is the creation of institutions that will operate steadily.

Unfortunately, war increases the sense of need for a strong leader, paternalism. In particular, 58% of respondents believe that "a few strong leaders can do more for the country than all laws and discussions." But this desire is situational, caused by war. After all, 64% of respondents believe that democracy is the most desirable type of government. Security in exchange for civil rights suits 39% of respondents, but 35% are willing to sacrifice security for the latter. Security is one of the values around which the Ukrainian identity is structured *(Sudyn, 2022)*.

From September 30 – October 13, 2023, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) conducted an All-Ukrainian public opinion poll "omnibus", which included questions about the direction of affairs in Ukraine and trust in individual institutions. The data obtained show that from May 2022 to October 2023, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and volunteers certainly remain trusted among the institutions on the list. For example, 94% of Ukrainians trust the Armed Forces of Ukraine (in May 2022 – 98%), and 87% trust volunteers (in May 2022 – 87%).

At the same time, during this period, there is a decrease in confidence in the institutions of the central government: from 91% to 76%, there are fewer people who trust the President, from 74% to 39% – the Government, from 58% to 21% – the Parliament. However, as noted in the report, it is important to distinguish between the situation for the government and parliament, where we see a majority that no longer trusts (and the balance of trust-distrust is negative), and for the president, where the overwhelming majority continue to trust him (and the balance of trust-distrust is positive).

Trust in local authorities has not changed: as of May 2022, now 50% trust it, and 46% do not trust it *(Kyivskyi mizhnarodnyi instytut sotsiolohi, 2023)*.

9. Conclusions

Thus, the war turned out to be a trigger for rethinking the meaning and forms of national identity based on historical and modern values – stability, trust, security, land. The war unleashed by the Russian Federation against the Ukrainian people testifies to the great concern of the Ukrainian people for their fate, history, and stages of statehood formation through the prism of the concept of "deep identification", delineating the mental space of "stability", "courage", and "trust". The problem of peace posed by this war broke the Soviet template about fraternal peoples, common history, imitation of the stereotypical understanding of oneself as a nation, as a civil society. Yes, indeed, the world is now on the verge of difficult trials, which are daily supplemented by crimes against will, freedom, independence, identification of oneself as a Ukrainian, absolutely stable and self-sufficient. Russian culture, based on the philosophical views of G. Skovoroda, P. Yurkevych, M. Dragomanov, M. Hrushevsky, a huge heritage of fiction, colored by the philosophical reflections of T. Shevchenko, L. Ukrainka, I. Franko, O. Kobylyanska, V. Stefanyk, M. Vovchok, National Crafts and outstanding Ukrainian artists hold on their shoulders a symbolic image of freedom, independence, freedom, cherished by all modern Ukrainians.

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