

INNOVATION, WORK, SOCIETY

MAX SCHELER'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF EXPERIENCE OF VALUES
AND THE FUNCTIONING OF WORLDVIEW**Andrii Budz**Postgraduate Student, Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University, Ukraine
e-mail: andrii.budz@pnu.edu.ua, orcid.org/0000-0003-3514-9385**Summary**

The concept of the phenomenology of the experience of values in the views of Max Scheler in its connection with the functioning of the worldview is investigated in the article. It is established that values are based on the phenomenology of the experience of values. On the basis of the phenomenological axiology of Max Scheler, it is shown that the phenomenology of the experience of values is a reliable criterion for structuring and constituting values in the worldview. The phenomenology of the experience of values is also the foundation of the involvement of objects in the system of worldview values and is the basis of structuring of values into spiritual and material types. A negative or positive attitude toward some object, granting it the status of value, or its denial happens through the phenomenology of the experience of values within a worldview. It is emphasized that the realization of objective values in the real world is possible through Apriori emotional intentions, which are phenomenological acts.

Key words: phenomenological axiology, experience of values, phenomenological experience, worldview, emotional apriorism, phenomenological acts.

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1. Introduction

Values are structural elements of a worldview, the elements of motivation of human behavior. The phenomenology of the experience of values is a criterion for granting various objects the status of value. In M. Scheler's views, such granting of the status of value happens based on the direct human experience of the value and the emotional a priori feeling of a value. Values are not simply abstract constructs in a human mind, but rather objective realities that are actualized in the real world through phenomenological emotional intentional acts. Scheler's phenomenology provides a significant insight into the experience of values, he emphasizes the role of emotions and intuition in the apprehension of values and the influence of such apprehension on worldview.

The object of research is the phenomenology of the experience of values of Max Scheler in its connection with the worldview. The goal of the article is to analyze the specifics of the functioning of the phenomenology of the experience of values in the structure of worldview through the prism of intentional emotional acts based on the example of the phenomenological axiology of Max Scheler.

Values and the phenomenology of their experience are studied in various aspects. Researchers grant values the status of structural elements of a social political and moral being of society (Lan et al., 2010; Sánchez Madrid, 2020; Rimkus, 2021). Some draw attention to the motivational dimension of values in behavior (Sagiv and Roccas, 2021; Russo et al., 2022). Several scientists perform studies in the direction of the phenomenology of values, in particular, M. J. Rohan (2000) analyzes the phenomenology of the connection of values and worldview. H. Helve (2015) analyzes the correlation between attitudes, values, and identity in the worldview. S. Roccas and A. Elster (2014) research the specifics of values in the religious worldview. P. Theodorou (2014) examines the phenomenology of values in the context of emotional perception. I. Vendrell Ferran (2022) analyzes the phenomenology of values in the context of the intentionality of feelings. A group of researchers draws attention to the connection between personal moral qualities and values (Roccas et al., 2002). H. Joas (2001) explores values in the experience of self-transcendancy when a person becomes a creator of values. D. Brax (2009) analyzes the hedonistic approach to the nature of values, where the criterion of becoming of value is pleasure, which is based on such distinct phenomenological quality as a feeling of liking. Similarly, O. M. Moen (2016) points out that pleasure is the only intrinsic value and pain is the only intrinsic disvalue. H. Andersson and Green Werkmäster (2021) analyze the degrees of the value of objects and emphasize that they are evaluated by two dimensions – the normative component and the attitudinal component, however, the latter should rather be used mainly based on the intensity of an attitude. C. Todd (2014) analyzes values in the context of emotions and emphasizes that emotions reveal, constitute, or create value. J. M. Müller (2017) thinks that emotions are ways of acknowledging values. G. R. Maio (2010) studies the phenomenology of social values and marks their connection with feelings, emotions, and beliefs. N. F. Barret (2014) studies the phenomenology of values in a religious worldview. K. C. Longest, S. Hitlin, and S. Vaisey (2013) draw attention to the phenomenology of individual values and individuals’ value orientations in various contexts. Some researchers examine the phenomenology of personal values, which are subjective in nature, and reflect what people think and state about themselves (Sagiv et al., 2017) and study the connection between personal values and personality traits and subjective well-being (Sagiv and Schwartz, 2022). S. H. Schwartz (1999) studies the types of cultural values in their connection with different nations’ attitudes toward the norms of work and its goals. S. Hitlin and J. A. Piliavin (2004) explore the connections between social structure and individual values and research associations between values in memory based on semantic relations among values (Pakizeh et al., 2007).

The article explores the interconnection of the phenomenology of the experience of values and its influence on worldview based on M. Scheler’s phenomenological axiology, which investigates the nature of values and their actualization in the real world employing intentional emotional acts as primary a priori intentional acts that reveal the objective structure of the values, i.e., by direct human experience of values rather than abstract reasoning about them. Values are not just theoretical constructs of human thought in a worldview, they are substantiated by emotions and are revealed through emotional acts, which can be clearly traced in the views of M. Scheler. Understanding values through their personal phenomenological experience allows a deeper understanding of their hierarchical structure and moral implications, which are correlated with worldview.

2. Emotional intuition of the experience of values

In the views of Max Scheler, values are objective entities, he substantiates their objective existence, stating that “there are authentic and true value-qualities that constitute a special domain of objectivities” (Scheler, 1973a: 15). The method of realization of such objective values is through phenomenological acts of emotional intentions. Such a method makes values essential to individuals’ ethical and worldview orientation, serving as a connector between universal values that are experienced by humans similarly due to their Apriori nature and their personal experience. Structure and moral implications. In general, he talks about the creation of non-formal ethics of values which he bases on the critique of the ideas of I. Kant. He states: “I will attempt to develop a non-formal ethics of values on the broadest possible basis of phenomenological experience” (Scheler, 1973a: 5). Such non-formal ethics centers around the phenomenological experience of values by the individual on an emotional level. Unlike cognitive or abstract categories, values are apprehended through intentional feelings – emotional acts that unveil their reality and meaning to an individual. For M. Scheler, this process presupposes engagement with the essence of values, and their intrinsic worth for humans, which are comprehended through phenomenological experience. He claims that “phenomenological experience is “immanent” experience... Only phenomenological experience is in principle non-symbolic and, hence, able to fulfill all possible symbols” (Scheler, 1973a: 51) In this context, values can be accessed only through a uniquely human emotional capacity – intuition, which is “essential intuiting, or “phenomenological intuition”, or “phenomenological experience” (Scheler, 1973a: 48). Intentional feelings function as an intuitive intermediary through which values are grasped by humans. This emotional intuition transcends subjective sentimentality due to the Apriori perception of values, revealing their ontological dimension.

M. Scheler’s views on the experience of values showcase a new approach to the interpretation of values, which emphasizes the emotional aspects of values rather than the reason. According to Scheler, “One can never sift the being of values out of any form of real being, no matter if we are concerned with real deeds, judgments, or experiences of oughtness” (Scheler, 1973a: 46). Hence, values are directly intuited by the means of phenomenological intentional acts, which are emotions, rather than rational thinking or abstract principles. This perspective places emotions and intuition into the central focus of the comprehension of values. Emotional intuition involves a form of intentionality that reveals the quality and worth of values.

Scheler emphasizes that the experience of values through emotional intuition has an a priori nature, it is immediate and pre-cognitive. Emotional acts in such cases provide a vivid and true example of what values mean to us, their intrinsic worth, unlike rational analysis, which often just generalizes and uses abstract notions. The immediacy of the phenomenological intentional emotional acts enables individuals to perceive a rigid hierarchy of objective values, differentiating between higher values (such as love) from lower ones (physical pleasure). The difference in ranking between values is thus based on the phenomenological experience of a person rather than abstract theoretical speculation, which is often inherent in certain types of worldviews. In such a case, the theoretical constructions of worldview in the context of values have to be confirmed on the phenomenological level of the human experience of such values. It is also important to understand that worldview constructions can vary and often opposite, however, the phenomenology of the experience of values is similar to all humans, which can serve as the basis for the creation of a universal axiological worldview.

Moreover, Scheler introduces the concept of “preferring and postponing”, saying that “the fact that one value is “higher” than another is apprehended is a special act of value-cognition: the act of preferring... Such preferring is a priori” (Scheler, 1973a: 87). Such act of preferring is instinctive, it describes what individuals prioritize in their experience, and reflects the alignment or misalignment of one’s emotional life with the objective order of values. Scheler’s exploration of values is also tied to his conception of the human person. He describes the human being as an “ordo amoris” – an “objectively correct order of stirrings... of love and hate” (Scheler, 1973b: 98). This order of love reflects how the objective hierarchy of values is aligned with the person’s emotional life, shaping their ethical orientation. In such context, one can consider that M. Scheler’s idea of ordo amoris affects the formation of worldview.

3. Worldview and the phenomenology of the experience of values

One can argue that worldview is a ruling and directing “parameter” of the phenomenology of the experience of values. This means that initially ontological ideas as structural elements of worldview create the basis for the understanding of reasons for interactions between elements of being and form the “picture of the world” of a human. Therefore, there is an impression that based on the theoretical constructions of worldview, particularly based on its ontological ideas, a person’s self-consciousness and self-feeling are formed, and a person’s place in the world is evaluated. In such cases, values are derivatives of worldview and don’t function independently from the structure of worldview since they are its elements.

Based on these notions, I disagree with the definition of values proposed by S. H. Schwartz, who thinks that “...values are trans-situational criteria or goals (e.g., security, hedonism), ordered by importance as guiding principles in life” (Schwartz, 1999: 25), since values are correlated with a worldview that defines goals and priorities. Therefore, the idea that values are “guiding principles in life” is debatable. (Schwartz, 1999: 25). Also debatable is the following approach that “individual” values frame the appropriate means and ends for social action, provide motivational impetus for such actions, and are vital for self-definition” (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004: 383). I also disagree with the thought that “according to the Theory of Basic Human Values, values are relatively stable, but not immutable, abstract goals which strongly influence peoples’ lives” (Russo et al., 2022: 692). In my opinion, values are elements of the structure of worldview, which first of all are correlated with ontological ideas, and based on that are systemically linked with other structural elements of worldview – preferences, norms, desires, emotions, feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, social expectations, ideals, and motivation. In this aspect, for example, I. Vendrell Ferran (2022: 86) states that “...consciousness of value is better conceptualized in terms of intentional feeling...”. P. Theodorou (2014) expresses a similar approach, taking pain, pleasure, and the intentionality dimension of emotions as the basis of structuring and experience of values. At the same time, emotional phenomena are formed in the context of morality. But morality is a part of a worldview, therefore the emergence of emotions and values based on them, has a worldview reason.

Although values can have “...the dynamic structure of values as a motivational continuum...” (Sagiv and Roccas, 2021: 310), they do not act as an autonomous motivational impetus (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004: 383) and don’t function as separate trans-situational criteria or goals or guiding principles in life (Schwartz, 1999: 25). Values are also not autonomous “abstract goals which strongly influence peoples’ lives” (Russo et al., 2022: 692). One can rather agree that “...values are more strongly connected to feelings than to past behavior or beliefs, and the types of emotion depend on the values” roles as ideal versus ought self-guides” (Maio, 2010: 2).

At the same time, C. Todd (2014) and J. M. Müller (2017) emphasize the connection between emotions and values, and G. R. Maio (2010: 36) points out that "...emotion plays a dominant role in judgments of value importance". To my mind, values do not perform the autonomous structuring or motivational function, which is independent of worldview. Values surely have a motivational goal (Russo et al., 2022: 692), however, the idea that "values work as a compass in people's lives" (Russo et al., 2022: 693) is debatable. Values are only elements of motivation, therefore motivation has a more complex character, since "the idea that motivations blend into one another is central to the value theory..." (Roccas et al., 2002: 798). To my mind, a true "compass of human life" is a worldview within which values are experienced, substantiated, and supported based on their phenomenological experience. Therefore, any change of values primarily anticipates the change of worldview beliefs, which in turn, can change based on phenomenological phenomena.

In this aspect, one should consider the thinking of H. Andersson and J. Green Werkmäster (2021: 532), who believe that "...the amount of value an object has is to be accounted for in terms of the intensity of the attitude that it is fitting to have towards the object", that is "...the intensity... of the attitude that captures the amount of value an object has" (Andersson and Green Werkmäster, 2021: 534). From this aspect values and degrees of values exist not independently. They depend on the intensity of humans' attitude toward that value (Andersson and Green Werkmäster, 2021), and such attitude has emotional and willful content, which is defined generally by the picture of existence.

One can interpret values in a hedonistic dimension, as do for example D. Brax (2009) and O. M. Moen (2016). I will note here that human direction towards hedonistic values is based also on the worldview, which points, for example, to the finiteness of human existence, particularly, in the context of antique atomism. However, for example, for the ascetic Christian worldview, the hedonistic values are absurd, because according to ontological ideas of Christianity, the body is sinful and mortal, and therefore bodily pleasures cannot be the meaning of the main values, on the contrary – such main values to human are spiritual values, which are linked with the spiritual primary basis of existence.

In this aspect, the most optimal approach regarding the correlation of values and worldview is the one proposed by M. J. Rohan, according to which he describes worldview "...in terms of a person's conscious beliefs – which are a function of that person's value priorities – about the way the world is or should be" (2000: 272), and therefore "...people's worldviews directly evidence their personal value systems" (Rohan, 2000: 269), hence "...the way people view their worlds is a function of their personal value priorities" (Rohan, 2000: 270). In this instance, in one way or another, the worldview is correlated with value priorities, and those are confirmed by the phenomenology of the experience of values, since without it, values as such are not possible, as claims, for example, M. Scheler.

A stable emotional and willful negative or positive attitude to an object has a worldview dimension. That is, a human wants to possess certain values or considers something to be a value and treats it as one depending on the phenomenological experience of values.

M. Scheler thinks that values function in the structure of phenomenology of the experience of values. The phenomenology of the experience of values is the main structural element of constituting values and moral norms within the worldview. Values can be identified with, e.g., moral ideals. For example, E. Rimkus (2021: 258) is close to identifying moral values and ideals since he believes that "...moral ideals (freedom, equality, justice, seeking of the common good) are the basic guide in the sphere of values for the social engineering directed to the creation of welfare state". Values create a complex phenomenological connection in the structure

of worldview with feelings (Maio, 2010: 2), or with value judgments since "...explicit value judgments provide an important tool for identifying value importance..." (Pakizeh, Gebauer, and Maio, 2007: 460). In this aspect, values are directly linked with the phenomenology of their experience in the structure of worldview, the elements of which are *feelings, emotions, preferences*, or other forms of negative or positive attitude to something or somebody.

From this perspective, taking into consideration M. Scheler's views regarding the influence of the phenomenology of the experience of values on the nature of values, one can argue that depending on the phenomenology of the experience of values a human: firstly, constructs a certain picture of the world and realizes one's place and meaning in existence; secondly, can experience a certain stereotypical system of values or, on the contrary, neglect them in their picture of the world; thirdly, apologizes the system of values and their hierarchy. The structural elements of worldview depend on the ontological ideas of worldview. That is, preferences, norms, desires, social expectations, will, emotions, feelings, and thoughts affect the formation of the phenomenology of the experience of values, which receives a negative or positive dimension, which apologizes an object or neglects and ignores it. In this aspect, the phenomenology of the experience of values affects moral and legal human behavior since values are included in the structure of moral and legal judgments.

From this, one can conclude the dependence of the phenomenology of the experience of values on the worldview, and on the other hand, one can conclude the influence of the phenomenology of the experience of values on the specifics of the worldview in its axiological dimension.

4. Phenomenology of experience of material and spiritual values in worldview

On the ontological level, values are material and spiritual benefits, which in the structure of worldview gain the status of aim and ideals, towards which a human aspires since they are "deficit" and provide human needs of material and spiritual character. Depending on the dominant phenomenology of the experience of values, values tend to belong to material and spiritual. Material values are directed at instantaneous benefit and pleasant feelings of satisfaction because human life in the context of materialism is short, temporary, and finite. Spiritual values are directed at a timeless perspective, and therefore they are characterized by the phenomenon of faith and hope in a better future and asynchronism with the current time, and vice versa – synchronism is characterized by eternal and transcendental basis of existence.

If towards the system of material values, there are no lasting discussions, then towards the system of spiritual values, such discussions are permanent. Material values often are associated with economic concepts, particularly with cost. Therefore, the status of material value is a thing that is being experienced as economically beneficial, and useful. The phenomenology of the experience of material values is based on sensuality, which is a criterion of attribution of things to material values, which bring use, benefit, and pleasure to humans. The goal of possessing material values is the satisfaction of material needs, and the criterion of such satisfaction is sensuality. Therefore that, which is perceived by humans as useful, beneficial, and pleasant has a chance to become a material value. In this aspect, for example, M. Scheler builds his material ethics of value emphasizing emotions of pleasure and pain that are at the core of "feeling of values". In such Scheler's sense, even material values are possible as the phenomenological experience of things and goods on the level of pleasure and pain, which points to the elements of the hedonism of his material ethics of value.

Argumentativeness of approaches towards spiritual values lies in that they do not bring direct visible benefit for humans, and therefore their importance often is doubted. Spiritual values do not fall under economic criteria of instantaneous benefit and thus need additional worldview substantiation that they really perform vital functions, and one cannot live without them. Consequently, spiritual values have a worldview dimension of their substantiation through belief, which indicates the existence of a spiritual primary basis of being, for example, God, with whom spiritual values correlate. The status of spiritual values is granted to objects through worldview, in which objects' axiological status is rationally substantiated depending on their correlation with a spiritual primary basis of being.

To substantiate that something is valuable to humans within a certain worldview, one should do so in substantial and existential aspects. That is, one should prove that this exact phenomenon is vital for human and their existence, because this phenomenon correlates with the primary basis of being. For something to be granted the status of a spiritual value, one should substantiate its existential and substantial significance for humans. Taking freedom as an example, it should be substantiated as the natural ability of a human without which the very human essence is lost. That is, a value should be such that substantially constitutes a person and is a necessary attribute of human existence in the context of certain expectations that are linked with the phenomenology of the experience of values, particularly the awareness of their importance and significance, as in the views of M. Scheler, for example.

Thus, the phenomenology of the experience of values on the level of pleasure and pain can be in the base of constituting of material values. Moreover, the feelings of ideality, holiness, perfection, and completeness are elements of the phenomenology of the experience of values, in particular religious. Mainly phenomenology of the experience of religious values is based on faith in the existence of God, which is a criterion of attribution of things to values. *Faith* in God creates a phenomenological basis for granting certain things ideality, absoluteness, holiness, perfection, importance, and completeness. That which is perceived as ideal, absolute, holy, perfect, important, and complete has the chance of becoming a religious value if it relates to an absolute being. In this aspect, for example, N. F. Barret (2014: 94) substantiates "...the value-centered approach to human experience and cognition..." and analyzes "...religion as a distinct sphere of values..." (Barret, 2014: 94) based on "... religion's evolutionary origins in terms that make value-rich engagement..." (Barret, 2014: 93). Hence, from N. F. Barret's (2014) point of view, values precede religion and structure it, although S. Roccas and A. Elster (2014: 199) note that "...religion can directly affect the development of values, through explicit and implicit value teaching and by encouraging behaviors that are consistent with the values endorsed by religion". But religion affects the development of values exactly in the context of faith in the existence of God, with whom these values correlate.

To my mind, the basis of the phenomenology of the experience of religious values is faith in the existence of transcendental phenomena, which perform fundamental functions in human life of help in difficult situations and future human salvation. That is, a true goal of possessing religious values is the satisfaction of needs of individual salvation and reaching future life, which is substantiated as possible based on the ontological ideas. Their basic experience is based on faith and hope in the existence of transcendental grounds, which will facilitate solving vital problems and the sense of life in general and will be a reliable method of personal salvation.

The feeling of justice, freedom, safety, social equality, social significance, a sense of being needed, social responsibility and duty, solidarity, and harmony are the elements of the phenomenology of the experience of spiritual values, particularly socio-political ones. Hence,

the phenomenology of the experience of socio-political values is based on moral and legal ideals. Herefrom, something that is evaluated as just, socially responsible, safe, significant, and needed – is being experienced as a socio-political value. But such experience of socio-political values is based on faith in human rationality as its species and existential foundation. Indeed, the understanding of humans as rational beings by their ontological nature creates the basis for the existence of morality and law. If a human by its nature is not an intelligent being, then the existence of morality and law, and consequently values that represent them, is put under question since a human can make a choice only on a rational basis.

Human activity happens based on the dynamic and synchronous system of the phenomenology of the experience of material and spiritual values. Such synchronization of the phenomenology of the experience of material and spiritual values is based primarily on feelings, emotions, feelings of pleasure and pain, which are important means of constituting values and reliable criteria of verification of values on their truthfulness in the context of a specific cultural-historical time.

5. Conclusions

The concept of correlation of the phenomenology of the experience of values and the worldview on the example of phenomenological axiology of M. Scheler is substantiated in the article. The article proves that on the one hand, values are derivatives from the phenomenology of the experience of values, and on the other hand the phenomenology of the experience of values is dependent on certain ideas in the structure of worldview.

Values are those elements of the worldview that have a systemic connection with other structural elements of the worldview – preferences, norms, desires, social expectations, will, emotions, feelings, beliefs, and thoughts. Based on the phenomenology of the experience of values a negative or positive attitude towards the object is formed, and an object is granted or refused the status of value. The phenomenology of the experience of values is a criterion of involvement of one or another object to the system of worldview values and creates the basis for the substantiation of the hierarchy of values. Based on the phenomenology of the experience of values the constituting of values into spiritual and material takes place, at the same time, their hierarchy in the system of values is correlated with the phenomenology of the experience of values.

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