

INNOVATION, WORK, SOCIETY**NATIONAL TRADITIONS OF DIPLOMACY
AS THE KEY TO UKRAINE'S REVIVAL****Liudmyla Chekalenko**

Doctor of Political Sciences, Professor, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv,
State Institution "Institute of World History of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine",
Honored Science and Technology Worker of Ukraine, Diplomat
e-mail: chekaliudmila@gmail.com, orcid.org/0000-0002-2819-9424

Andriy Kudriachenko

Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, Honored Science and Technology Worker
of Ukraine, Director, State Institution "Institute of World History of the National Academy
of Sciences of Ukraine", Ukraine
e-mail: kudani@ukr.net, orcid.org/0000-0002-3833-989X

Summary

The aim of this paper is to prove the hypothesis: the national experience of Ukraine's Diplomacy is a basis of future revival of Ukrainian State. The author examined all stages of the development of Ukraine's diplomacy: from Kievan Rus to the nowadays. Chekalenko Liudmyla proved main concept of historical periodization of this process. The main idea of author is based on a principally important concept of the formation and development of the foreign policy paradigm of Ukraine during a significant historical period of Ukrainian statehood. Our state, same as its policy, originates from the Trypillya culture, develops through the Skiff era and forms a powerful Kyievan Rus.

The author proved that the roots of tolerance, respect for each other, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, diplomatic protocol, etc. have been laid in Ukrainian diplomacy since ancient times in the Byzantine Empire.

This is in those times that not only the general concept of the world and human existence but also the principles of international existence, patriotism, humanism, tolerance, conventional relations and diplomacy by Bizantic influence were formed on our lands. Next period that covers the times of Cossack State contains a lot of elements of the statehood and foreign policy activity of those times that were inherited and developed by the Cossack Army.

Ukrainian Diplomacy during the Cossack state period, according to the author, initiated the military foundations of diplomatic means and foreign policy decisions. The author came to this conclusion after analyzing numerous documents from the era of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi's hetmanship.

The period of the years 1917–1920 is marked by the struggle for the independence of the Ukrainian state, civilized entrance into the world of international relations, use of diplomatic means and methods to defend the Ukrainian interests. The article proves that the Diplomacy of Ukraine in 1917–1920 acquired signs of Europeanness and modernity, which meets the criteria

of international law laid down in the diplomatic foundation of the development of the state's foreign policy structures.

In the period of Soviet existence, the forms of international activity of Ukraine within the USSR were being under review. Ukraine was deprived of its own foreign policy and diplomacy, and was completely dependent on Moscow. Unfortunately, at that times Ukraine was more often not a subject but object of the foreign policy and deplomacy in the above-mentioned periods when the овiдає

The problem was compounded by the fact that throughout the centuries of its rule, the Russian Empire did not recognize the existence of the Ukrainian people and Ukraine, its culture, language, and traditions. The tsarist centuries were supplemented by 70 years of Soviet power, when the communist party ruled the U.S.S.R. Textbooks were written specifically about the history of the Soviet russia and not about Ukraine. Only with the independence of Ukraine did it become possible to write and publish our own Ukrainian textbooks about the objective history of our people.

Key words: concepts of realism, synergistic effect, diplomatic methods, unprofessionalism, deep mistakes of authorities, differential political views.

DOI <https://doi.org/10.23856/6822>

1. Introduction

Based on the professional analysis of the results of the foreign policy, the author identified a number of miscalculations by the presidential authorities in making important and influential decisions, the consequences of which our state and Ukrainian foreign policy are still feeling today.

The deep mistake of the Ukrainian authorities in different historical periods as the author proves was the unconditional support of the Moscow throne, naive trust in the promises of the Moscow authorities, and unfortunately, the lack of unity in Ukrainian society.

Based on the results of the foreign policy discourse, the author concludes that the imperial machine itself formed such a situation in all the regions of the country, setting one layer of society against another, buying the Ukrainian ruling elite with bribes and land grants, destroying all progressive-thinking representatives of democratic Ukrainians.

The result of such an attitude was a threat to the further development of Ukrainian state. In fact, the conclusion was made that it was Ukraine that contributed to the revival of the Russian Empire and actually gave birth to its own anemy, who are now trying to degrade the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian state. Ukraine was one of creator of the Tsarist Russian Empire. The author for the first time reveals the phenomenon of saving the empire in historical and political dimensions.

In modern times Ukraine faces a difficult challenge of protection of the achievements of the Ukrainian people, gaining by our country of a dissent place in the international division of labor, protection of the rights of the Ukrainian citizens, informational provision of the sovereign existence, etc. In the article, the author provides impotant information, that during centuries Ukrainian deplomacy founded new forms of diplomatic communication in the Ukrainian foreign environment, successful decisions and questionable solutions, so false steps. Incorrect decisions, as the article says, it is still very difficult to change and correct today, because of which Ukraine has lost its military potential in the begening of russian war against Ukraine.

There is proven, that these were not only diplomatic mistakes, but also outright cruel crimes of the first persons of the country – the presidents, which provoked the war and led our country to political collaps. All these facts have led to profound negative consequences both in the development of diplomacy and the existence of the State of Ukraine itself.

Methods. The study is implemented considering the theory and practice of political realism. For this purpose, dialectical methods of development and stagnation, quantity and quality, negation of negation, as well as systemic-comparative approaches are used, which in combination give a synergistic effect of the obtained research results.

Results. The conceptual principles of the development of the diplomatic component of Ukraine's foreign policy are analyzed. Such as, as the theory and basic provisions of international law, the origins of which are the components of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and preservation of territorial integrity. The concepts of realism, which are applied both in foreign policy tools and in the implementation of the system of diplomatic methods. This methods enabled Ukraine to maintain sovereignty for a certain time and survive in long-term times of war and were also an impetus for the upward development of the state. So, at the same time, various shortcomings and miscalculations in international decision-making are identified and investigated, caused, and sometimes provoked by a certain unprofessionalism of diplomatic personnel, as well as differential political views and beliefs of the executors themselves.

2. The historiography of article

The historiography of the problem is characterized by broad thematic explorations, monographs, and descriptions of selected historical events. The author analysed a wide range of sources on formation of the state and foreign policy of Ukraine, archive documents, documents of the ministries of foreign affairs as Ukraine and other countries. The Ukrainian historiography has important place in the list of the sources. There are the books of famous Ukrainian historians – M. Hrushevsky, V. Antonovych, O. Apanovych, M. Braychevsky, V. Holobutsky, D. Doroshenko, O. Yefymenko, M. Kotliar, I. Krypyakevych, N. Polonska-Vasylenko, O. Subtelny, O. Shulhin, D. Yavornytsky and many others.

Scientific explorations of domestic and foreign researchers, the subject of which was Ukrainian foreign policy and diplomacy, have become especially popular and significant in times of the independent Ukraine. There are the works by professors of Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University V. Kopyika (2012: 264), O. Koppel and O. Parkhomchuk (2004: 320), L. Chekalenko (2016: 308; 2021: 207; 2024), M. Doroshko (2024: 29–39) and so on.

Among foreign researchers, the works of Barry Buzan (2018), B. Lette (2016), Ronnie D. Lipschutz (1995), Ole Waver (2020) and others are particularly important and attracted attention. The works of the above-mentioned authors are quite interesting and rich reflections on the current state of international relations and various scenarios for the future development of the world. However, the authors did not pay special attention to Ukrainian historical events in foreign policy and diplomacy. Ukrainian and foreign authors devoted their works to the theory of international relations, international systems of the global era, the history of European integration and the EU in nowadays, etc. But the political and legal analysis of the formation, development and specific of the Ukrainian diplomatic system and the implemented schemes of foreign policy decisions in different historical periods of Ukraine's development did not come into their field of attention.

3. The main idea of the author

Our state, same as its policy, originates from the Trypillya culture, develops through the Skiff era and forms a powerful Kyievan Rus. This is in those times that not only the general concept of the world and human existence but also the principles of international existence, patriotism, humanism, tolerance, conventional relations and diplomacy were formed on our lands. Next period that covers the times of Cossack State contains a lot of elements of the statehood and foreign policy activity of those times that was inherited and developed by the Cossack Army.

The period of the years 1917–1920 was marked by the struggle for the independence of the Ukrainian state, civilized entrance into the world of international relations, use of diplomatic means and methods to defend the Ukrainian interests. In the period of Soviet power the forms of international existence of Ukraine within the USSR are being under review. In modern times with the achievement of the state sovereignty the foreign policy components of the assertion of Ukraine as a subject of the international law with the state goals, its own foreign policy and international obligations are being analyzed.

The modern Ukraine faces a difficult challenge of protection of the achievements of the Ukrainian people, gaining by our country of a dissent place in the international division of labor, protection of the rights of the Ukrainian citizens, informational provision of the sovereign existence, etc. State interests of Ukraine consist in realization of the strategic, political, economic, legal and ideological goals. Every historic period of the development of the Ukrainian statehood is marked by a specific position of Ukraine or its regions that existed either comparatively independently or within other states.

Unfortunately, Ukraine was more often not a subject but object of the foreign policy and diplomacy in the above-mentioned periods when the destiny of the Ukrainian lands depended on other more powerful nations. So, during centuries Ukrainian diplomacy founded new forms of diplomatic communication in the Ukrainian foreign environment, successful decisions and questionable solutions, so false steps. Incorrect decisions have led to profound negative consequences both in the development of diplomacy and the existence of the State of Ukraine itself. The problem was compounded by the fact that throughout the centuries of its rule, the Russian Empire did not recognize the existence of the Ukrainian people and Ukraine, its culture, language, and traditions. The tsarist centuries were supplemented by 70 years of Soviet power, when the communist party ruled the USSR. They also did not recognize the right of all the peoples of the Union to free development. The citizens were called Soviet people, and Ukraine was not defined as a separate state. This is what was taught at school and in institutes. Textbooks were written specifically about the history of the Soviet country, and not about Ukraine. The archives were hidden from researchers. Only with the independence of Ukraine did it become possible to write and publish our own Ukrainian textbooks about the objective history of our people.

The deep mistake of the Ukrainian authorities in different historical periods was the unconditional support of the Moscow throne, naive trust in the promises of the Moscow authorities, and unfortunately, the lack of unity in Ukrainian society. Today it can be argued that the imperial machine itself formed such a situation in all the regions of the country, setting one layer of society against another, buying the Ukrainian ruling elite with bribes and land grants, destroying all progressive-thinking representatives of democratic Ukrainians. The result of such an attitude was not only negative but it was a threat to the further development of Ukrainian state, since the Ukrainian land continued to exist according to the rules imposed by Moskovia.

In fact, Ukraine was one of creator of the Tsarist Russian Empire and soviet empire – U.S.S.R. Professor Chekalenko Liudmyla Dmytrivna is the author of the concept of revealing the phenomenon of the "salvation" of the empire in historical and political dimensions by its vassals who were part of it.

Considering the fact that the Russian empire in the face of its rulers: tsar Peter the First and tsarina Catherine the Second and others managed to inform the West about Ukraine as a not capable power that had neither history and nor culture. They twisted and rewritten Ukrainian history. These ideas many scholars in the West repeat for today too (in a practice of the Russian information or nowadays "Russia today"). But such information was taken from Russian sources through the French culture of XVIII–XIX centuries, which was highly esteemed in the empire. Imperial power replicates another ideas and falsification history, even the concept and name of "Rus" were removed from the history of Ukraine. As a result, the new generations in the empire and West didn't know about Ukrainian objective history, politics, culture, literature, art etc.

4. The Diplomacy of Kievian Rus

Historical documents tell us about first steps of foreign policy of the future Ukrainian state. Crowning of Prince Oleg (882–912) in Kyiv marked the union between North and South of Rus state. In 882 Oleg pronounced the city of Kyiv to be the capital of the newly formed state: „May Kyiv be a mother of the Rus cities”. Oleg united another territories to Kyiv: Severians, the Rodymychis, the Dulibs, the Tiverians, the Croatians, etc. The diplomacy at that time was a part of wars. Some Byzantine documents said us about Oleg's powerful army and his battles against Byzantium. So, Oleg's delegation – future embassy – conducted the negotiations in the Byzantine capital. Some important treaties with Byzantium were signed in 907, 911, and 944. The Treaty of 911 that confirmed all the oral agreements of 907 consisted of two documents (briefs): one brief was verified by the Byzantine Emperor and given to the ambassadors of Rus and another one was verified by the ambassadors and given to the Emperor. According to those documents the liabilities of Rus were paid for with Byzantine gold in the form of homage as well as with other commercial and political fees. For example, in accordance with the 911 treaty Oleg managed to obtain a few privileges: coverage of all long-term living expenses for the ambassadors of Rus by the Greeks, and the right of free trade in all Byzantine cities provided that the living expenses of the merchants were also fully covered by the Greeks.

The conditions of the relations included in the treaty could be called a diplomatic etiquette in a modern language. The treaty was written in two languages – Slavic and ancient Greek. All payments were calculated in Greek currency, which were equal to 327,45 kg of silver. The Slavs traded in copper, wax, and fur, and the Byzantines traded in clothes, pepper, wine, jewelry, etc. According to the sources of literature there were close relations between Rus and Byzantium after the treaty had been signed: the countries acted together against the Arabs from Crete when Rus ensured participation of its army consisting of 700 soldiers (*as stated by the Emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, 913–959*). The detailed written document about military alliance between Byzantium and Kyievan Rus of 944 is considered the top of the Rus diplomatic practices. It was stated that Rus was responsible for protecting the Byzantine territories in the Crimean area against all the enemies.

The “diplomatic” decisions we can named the policy of famous political figure of those times – Princess Olga (945–964), when she was a leader of Kievian Rus. Princess avenged her husband's death (Igor – the Oleg's son). According to the legends the whole delegation of

the Drevlyans invited to Kyiv per Olga's orders was buried alive, and the Drevlyan capital of Korosten was cunningly set on fire and so on. These facts show the traditions of those times and the specific art of diplomacy.

Princess Olga with delegation received a warm welcome in Constantinople. In honor of Olga on September, 9, 955 the Greeks arranged a formal dinner party including performance by musicians. In 959 Princess Olga sent the ambassadors to the German King Otton I and others. Her son Svyatoslav was famous soldier and his son Volodymyr the Great (980–1015) united some territories with Rus. Volodymyr the Great accepted Christianity and married the Byzantine princess Anna who was the sister of Byzantine emperors Basil and Constantine. Christianization of Rus opened the way to enormous cultural impact. In 988 the ambassadors of the Pope Silvester II visited Kyiv and Volodymyr's ambassadors paid a diplomatic visit to the residence of the Pope of Rome. Kyiv was also visited by the ambassadors of the Czech and Ugrian kings as well as of the Polish prince Boleslaw Lesmian.

As Volodymyr realized the importance of matrimonial ties, he arranged marriages of his children to foreigners. During Volodymyr's reign Kyiv became stronger. The city was a home to people from all over the world – the Scandinavians, the Franks, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Danes; commercial relations of Rus were broadened.

International relations as well as authority of Rus were strengthening in time of Yaroslav (1019–1054) who was called Wise due to his policies. Matrimonial ties or marriage diplomacy were also widely used to strengthen the positions of Kyievan Rus in the world. Yaroslav's daughter Anna was a wife of the French king Anri I on May 14, 1049, in the cathedral of the city of Reims in France. After the king's death Anna reigned in France. Her signature was "Anna of Rus, the Queen of France". The famous "Reims Gospel" which she gifted to the church during her wedding ceremony is kept in the National Library in Paris. This is the Gospel on which French kings have been taken an oath to France for many centuries. The laws of Kyievan Rus were put together by Yaroslav the Wise as a Code of Laws called "The Rus Truth", which contained provisions regarding foreigners as well. Being a highly educated person himself, Yaroslav cared about education of the country. In accordance with his orders a school and a library were established as a part of the Cathedral of St. Sophia; they were known all over Europe. During the reign of Yaroslav the Wise, foreign policies of Kyievan Rus encouraged broadening of diplomatic ties and improvement of political contact with a lot of European countries. As noted by the Russian historian M. Karamzin, ancient Kyiv was decorated with the samples of Byzantine arts and enlivened with presence of foreign merchants and visitors from Greece, Germany, Italy, etc., and thus it was greater than Moscow in many aspects (*Krechethnikov, Artem, 2016*). Kyievan Rus became the desired object and the respected subject in the foreign policies of many countries. Well-known European leaders had to take its strength into consideration. It was certainly the period of prosperity of its diplomacy as well.

There are some very important moments with the name of Rus. It should be noted that the name "Rus" was later borrowed by Moscow "scientists" on the orders of Russian tsar Peter I. And not only the name of Rus, but also the entire history of the establishment and development of Kievan Rus from St. Andrew, who in V st. proclaimed the emergence of Kiev in the Kiev's Mountains, were captured by moscovites and adapted to its history. Why did it happen? Foreign geographers and historians wrote about Moscow state which had appeared only from the 14th century, and Kievan state – at the beginning of 5th century. The history of Kyievan Rus or Rus-Ukraine was in fact stolen and adapted to the Moscow concept of the "length" of the history of the future empire. The history of Rus-Ukraine was forebided and Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian language were forbidden too by Peter I and Katrine II. As a result, another prussian

books were written; new textbooks were created in Russian language. West in general and Western scholars received Russian's empire propaganda of 18th century: the Moscow version of history – artificial invented history without Rus-Ukraine. This is the reason why the West still does not know another history, but perceives it through the prism of Moscow's virtual scheme.

The Kievan Rus period of development of Ukrainian statesmanship led to the Halych-Volyn period in the 13th century and then into the Lithuanian-Rus-Polish statesmanship of the 14th – 16th centuries. The states of Vladimir and Moscow were neither heirs nor successors of the Kyievan state. They had their different own roots, and their relations with the Kievan state were as a relations between the Roman state and the Gallic provinces than to the succession of two periods in the political and cultural life of France. “The Kievan government did introduce the Great Rus lands to the forms of social and political systems, laws and culture created in Kyiv during its historic existence. However, it is not the definite reason to include Kievan state into the history of the Great Russian nation. Ethnographic and historic similarities of the Ukrainian-Rus nation and the Great Russian nation should not be the reason to mix them as they lived their own life”, – famous historian Myhaylo Hrushevskyi wrote (*Myhaylo Hrushevskyi, 1904: 299–300*).

These differences were accentuated by the Mongol invasions that began in the 1220s and culminated in capture and destruction Kiev in 1240.

5. The diplomacy of the Cossacks epoch

The next stage of formation of the principles of Foreign policy and Diplomacy of Ukraine we see of epoch by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi. The Liberation War of the mid 17th century became a milestone in the Ukrainian history because it created opportunities and conditions for formation of the sovereign state. Khmelnytsky was a petty nobleman and Cossack officer who, unable to obtain justice for wrongs suffered at Polish hands, fled to the Sich in late 1647 and was soon elected Hetman. In January 1649 Khmelnytsky entered Kiev to triumphal acclaim as liberator. He set about establishing a system of government and state finances, created a local administration under a new governing elite, diplomats drawn from the Cossack officers, and initiated relations with foreign states. Still prepared to recognize royal sovereignty, however, he entered negotiations with the Poles. In 1654 at Pereyaslav he concluded with Moscow an agreement whose precise nature has generated enormous controversy. Khmelnytsky in 1655 again cast about for new alliances and coalitions involving Sweden, Transylvania, Brandenburg, Moldavia, and Walachia, and there were indications that the Hetman planned to sever the moscovite connection but died before he could do so.

The hetman state reached its zenith in the hetmancy of Ivan Mazepa. (*Doroshenko, D.I., 1992: 136–146*). Ivan Mazepa continued the diplomatic traditions of B. Khmelnytsky. One of the most famous opposition figures was Mazepa's associate Pylyp Orlyk (1672–1742) who was elected hetman by the group of Cossacks and Cossack chairmen in immigration on May 5, 1710. On April 16, 1710, the following documents were executed: the Pact – treaty with a Swedish king and the Constitution of the rights and freedoms of the Zaporozhian Army (*History of Ukraine, 1997*). The 1710 Constitution began with the official statement that “Ukraine on both sides of the Dniپر shall be free from foreign rule forever”.

The central administrative body was overseen by the hetman and led by the collegiums of the general chairmen consisting of a clerk, a Cossack ensign, a Cossack yesaul, a Cossack standard-bearer and a judge, and each one of them had his own responsibilities. The general clerk, among other things, was responsible for keeping up with international

relations and performed the functions of the minister of foreign affairs. The state attributes or kleynods were the state seal, state flags; the attributes of hetman power were the club / mace and the bunchuk. The administrations of the general Cossack Yesaul (in Turkish language “yasaul” means chief) and the general Cossack standard-bearer performed the most important tasks ordered by the hetman such as overseeing the army and being ambassadors of Ukraine in other countries. Foreigners called them hetman’s adjutant-generals. The general Cossack standard-bearer also performed ceremonial functions when receiving visitors from foreign countries and so on.

International contacts of the Cossacks intensified significantly and expanded after coming to power and military victories of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who, according to Prosper Merimee “was fluent in Polish, Russian, Turkish and Latin, had a subtle and acute intellect, was patient and cunning” (*Prosper Merimee*). At his residence in Pereyaslav Bohdan Khmelnytsky met with envoys of European states, Transylvanian Prince George Rakoczy, ambassadors of the Ottoman Sultan and the Moscow Tsar. He held talks with Polish representatives, established and developed relations with Sweden.

After B. Khmelnytsky the greatest contribution to the development of Ukrainian diplomacy was made by hetmans Ivan Vygovsky, Ivan Mazepa and Pylyp Orlyk. Foreign travelers who visited Ukraine were amazed by prosperity, high level of development of agriculture, education, publishing industry, arts and crafts, construction industry, etc. Culture, hospitality and amiability of Ukrainian people were especially amazing when compared to life in Moscow, for example Paul of Aleppo from Syria (*Feodorov, Ioana*. 2020). They were surprised by how prosperous and culturally developed Ukraine was: cleanliness, politeness, picturesque houses and beautiful landscape reminded him of Denmark. Ukrainians were known and respected all over the world. Heads of the leading European countries considered it an honor to have Ukraine as their political and military ally. All these facts prove how highly developed the Ukrainian policy. The spirit of Ukrainian people survived long-lasting wars and devastation. It put Ukraine at the time of hetmans ruling next to the leading European countries of that time. According to the documents the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was supposed to be under the control of the Byzantine patriarch instead of a Moscow one. The old Ukrainian borders were supposed to be restored.

In 1783 the Ukrainian Cossack army was not independent anymore and was joined with the Russian army. In 1796 the Little Russian province was created on the territory where hetmans had used to reign.

The territories of the right-bank Ukraine (Volyn, Kyivschyna and Podillya) have their own history. The territorial entities bearing the same names had been parts of the Great Lithuanian Princedom during the period of the 15th-16th centuries. Later when the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth was formed (1569), those territories were owned by the Polish king.

6. The Diplomacy of Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR)

The events of the national liberation movement of 1917 led to the raise of the Central Council of Ukraine to power. The independent Ukrainian parliament was led by historian and professor Mykhaylo Hrushevskyi. With its First Universals (laws) the Central Council proclaimed the right of Ukrainian people to self government, it formed the executive body of the General Secretariat and legitimized Ukrainian autonomy. With its Third Universal the Central Council proclaimed formation of Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) within the borders of the federative Russia. The Ukrainian government did not manage to make peace with the Bolshevik Russia which started military action against Ukraine in the end

of December 1917. Only when the Bolshevik troops entered Kyiv and fired directly at the president's own building, only then the Fourth Universal Declaration was signed, which spoke of the independence of Ukraine. And as a result, there was a brilliant scheme of Ukrainian diplomacy beginning of the 20th century in 1917: the official first Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared.

At the beginning of 20th century, the state power of Ukraine made series of catastrophic mistakes. And the first one, the army wasn't created and so on. Apparently, the Ukrainian powers and some diplomats too poorly studied the history and forgot that good power and good Diplomacy need guns and other weapons.

So, being under the Bolshevik fire attack, the leaders of the Central Council understand the real policy of Bolshevik dictatorship. On January 12, 1918 M. Hrushevskyi issued Universal IV of the Central Council announcing the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Ukraine. The movement aimed at formation of the government bodies of the republic spread all over Ukraine. On January 4, 1918 in the Kyiv hotel "Savoy" on Khreschatyk Street there was a meeting of the members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Oleksandr Shulhin (1889–1960), the member of the Ukrainian federal socialist party, was appointed the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Oleksandr Shulhin was the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from December 26, 1917 to January 22, 1918. After that he was a Ukrainian ambassador in Bulgaria, a delegate at the Paris Peace Conference. Having immigrated abroad, he was the head of the Ukrainian Fellowship of the League of Nations Allies. In 1946 he was elected the head of the Ukrainian Academic Fellowship in Paris (*Chekalenko L.D., 2021: 157–167*).

On December 22, 1917 the Head of the General Secretariat of the People's Republic of Ukraine V. Vynnychenko and the General Secretary of Foreign Affairs O. Shulhin approved "The Bill about the Formation of the General Secretariat of Foreign Affairs". Ukraine proclaimed humane ideas of peace campaign and human rights. On November 21, 1917 the Ukrainian People's Republic addressed all the people in the world about making peace. In its announcement the Central Council suggested the Russian people as well as the allies and the enemy states actively participate in the negotiations.

The way the situation was developing at the time made the Central Council look for support abroad. On January 26 (13), 1918 the delegations of the countries of the Quarter Union accepted Ukraine as an independent country. On February 9, 1918 the first peace Treaty in the history of the World War I was signed in Brest-Lytovsk between the Ukrainian People's Republic and four countries of the German coalition, namely Germany, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. The borders of Ukraine were defined in accordance with the Western ethnographic borders of Ukrainian settlements.

The negotiations with the russian (bolsheviks) representatives turned out to be the most difficult ones. The bolsheviks did not see how they could build socialism in Russia without Ukrainian bread and coal and industrial potential of Donbas. It was a catastrophe for Russia to surrender the Donbas territory to Ukraine. That was one of the main reasons why the Soviet Russia invaded Ukraine in January of 1918.

The Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky played a special role in the formation and the development of a diplomatic service of Ukraine. The implementation of foreign policy in Hetmanat Skoropadsky was entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which consisted of two departments: general affairs and external relations. The landmarks of Hetman's diplomacy were traditional: in the foreground, in addition to international recognition, there was the problem of the unity of the Ukrainian lands, on the second – relations with the states of the former Russian Empire. Hetman P. Skoropadsky's government sent its representatives to 10 countries and accepted the

foreigners representatives from 11 one. Ambassadors were sent to Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Embassies were open in Bulgaria, and the All-Major Donskoy Army was founded. Diplomatic missions were sent to Finland, Switzerland, Romania, Kuban, Scandinavian countries of the Antanta. During the period of the Hetman government, the first domestic consular courses – an educational institution that was called upon to provide the state with diplomatic and consular specialists – began their activities.

By May 1918, consular offices of Ukraine actively operated in Berlin, Vienna, Istanbul and Bucharest, Georgia with the extension of powers to Armenia and Azerbaijan. In times of Ukrainian Consular network states have developed primarily due to its expansion in the regions of, where there were 30 consular institutions. During this time, the Consul was accredited in Minsk, the consul was sent to Riga (now the capital of Latvia), in July. And consulates were opened in Danzig (now Gdansk, Poland), Sofia, Tiflis (now Tbilisi, Georgia), in Baku (now the capital of Azerbaijan). Consulates were set up in Iasi (Romania), Warsaw and Helsinki. In total, at that time, 50 consular offices worked. In connection with the Brest Peace Treaty of the RSFSR with the states of the Fourth Alliance on March 3, 1918, consular contacts between the Soviets Russia and Ukraine were stopped (*Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky – Hetman of the Ukrainian State*).

The characteristic feature of the activities of consular offices during the period of the Directory of the Ukrainian People Republic was orientation towards Europe. Consular offices existed in Berlin, Brussels, Vienna, Geneva, the Hague, Helsinki, London, Munich, Paris, Stockholm, Zurich and others. Since the Directory of the UPR lost control of the country, it was not able to accept the foreign affairs. Regardless of such situation the Ukrainian diplomatic representatives were sent to the Paris Peace Conference 1919 – 1920. The delegation, which, moreover, was a plenipotentiary diplomat of the UNR in France, many missions were also sent to others. A diplomatic delegation of the UNR was in Warsaw for the purpose of negotiations (*Lupandin, O.I., 2021: 21*).

The significant problem in the activities of diplomatic institutions was the lack of money. Unfortunately, dishonest people oversaw financial affairs in the government of Symon Petliura. Considerable theft of state money began – there was not enough to maintain diplomatic institutions abroad, to help prisoners of war who were in Polish concentrate camps, to equip the army. The head of state S. Petliura complained that there were no decent people in the government... However, none of the criminals was punished (*Radio Liberty, 2019*).

So, S. Petliura blamed for not taking care of the creation of a real army that would protect the state. This information does not correspond to reality since he was removed from managing defense – removed from office. The case concerns political and personal reasons: a conflict between state leaders (V. Vinnychenko and S. Petliura). We can also add to the miscalculations of the Ukrainian government the lack of ideological work among the army and society. Ukraine lost in domestic politics, as the authorities pursued an indecisive policy regarding the formation of an army that was tired of fighting, and since the distribution of land began, the peasant soldiers returned home to their villages (*M. Kovalchuk, 2017*).

We cannot help but recall a very important event in the history of Ukrainian cultural diplomacy, which drew attention to independent Ukraine, went beyond Europe, reached the USA and was forever imprinted in the memory of generations with its wonderful music. In Ukraine it is called the folk song "Shchedryk", and in the world "Carol of The Bells". At a time when the Bolshevik troops of the Red Army, sent by Lenin to destroy free and democratic Ukraine, invaded Ukraine, Symon Petliura made an extraordinary decision: he ordered to find a Ukrainian folk choir under the leadership of conductor Košyts and send it on a tour of Europe

at the expense of the state. This plan was brilliantly implemented. The choir performed in the most prestigious theaters of the leading European countries, and was later invited to the USA, where it performed in the most prestigious theaters and stages (*"Shchedryk"*, 2022).

The high art of performing Ukrainian folk songs drew attention to independent Ukraine, to the depths of the values and spirituality of the Ukrainian people. Europe and America will now know and remember Ukraine and Ukrainians.

Such a soft policy cost Ukraine very dearly: there was no one to defend Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian diplomatic service was formed as the state institution most closely related to the modern form for the period from December 1917 to May 1924 – the closure of the last Extraordinary Diplomatic Missions of the UNR in Hungary. The normative basis of the diplomatic service was developed considering the relevant European experience and requirements of international law. It was a fundamental difference between the foreign policy departments of the UNR and Soviet Ukraine, which used the sectoral normative documents of the Russian soviet republic or the USSR (*Ukrainian diplomacy*, 2014).

The Bolshevik Party won in Ukraine. The government of S. Petliura emigrated to the West. On December 30, 1922, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) – a federation of Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (S.F.S.R.) – was proclaimed. Thus, in the early 1920-ies of XX century Ukraine lost not only the state, it lost the possibility to conduct its own foreign policy. So, in fact, the soviet Ukraine helped revive the empire, the empire of evil. The russian authorities began a "cleansing" of the population of Ukraine, liqueded patriots and democrates, who promoted the Ukrainian idea. The terrible famine of the 1930s, specially organized by the Soviet authorities led by Stalin, finally suppressed the movement of resistance of Ukrainians to Soviet power.

7. Ukraine's Diplomacy in novadays

The sovereign Ukraine directs its foreign poli and Diplomacty to the strengthening of peace and stability through the protection of its national interests and security. Foreign policy activity of the state is found on the principles of international law: respect for the sovereignty, equality, non-intervention into internal affairs of other states, recognition of territorial integrity and inviolability of the existing borders, development of large-scale cooperation, rejection of the threat and use of force, protection of human rights, etc. The modern Ukraine faces a difficult challenge of protection of the achievements of the Ukrainian people, gaining by our country of a dis-sent place in the international division of labor, protection of the rights of the Ukrainian citizens, informational provision of the sovereign existence, etc. (*Chekalenko Liudmyla D*, 2021: 105)

8. Conclusions

State interests of Ukraine consist in realization of the strategic, political, economic, legal and ideological goals. Every historic period of the development of the Ukrainian statehood was marked by a specific position of Ukraine or its regions that existed either comparatively independently or within other states.

So, on this path, Ukrainian authorities also made serious mistakes in the implementation of foreign policy and diplomacy. The leaders of the state continued to be under the "Russian" burden, rejecting all proposals from Moscow not from the interests of Ukraine, but from the interests of Russia. Such issues concern the involvement of Ukraine in the orbit of Russian projects, fierst of all the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); signing unprofitable for

Ukrainian interest some treaties; the removal of important geopolitical provisions from the treaty documents on the some parts of border territory in to interest of Russia; the sea border; the offul situation was with the Army of Ukraine: main commanders were russien citizens; the distribution of Soviet property; the ownership of Soviet armies; the distribution of real estate of the USSR in particular and diplomatic institutions abroad. The annexation by Russia of Crimea and some eastern regions of Ukraine were the most humiliating events. The invader sensed Ukraine's weakness and launched a massive brutal war aimed at destroying the state of Ukraine.

The diplomatic achivments of Ukraine. The beginning of 1990 Ukraine signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with EU but as a European state needed to be useful for the defence forces of EU. The new Agreement between Ukraine and EU on Association was signed. The defence of Ukraine, counteraction enemy and involvement of leading world powers to support Ukraine is discussed on all international levels. With this aim, appeals to the International Court were filed, more than 40 meetings of the OSCE Permanent Council and more than 30 meetings of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and Parliamentary Assembly of the CE, as well as a number of extraordinary meetings of the UN Security Council were held. In the framework of international organizations, decisions and resolutions were adopted that condemned Russia's policy. The delegation of the Russian Federation was deprived of vote power in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (*Chekalenko Liudmyla D., 2023: 248–268*).

Sanctions against Russia were strengthened: restrictions for Russia were introduced by the EU, USA, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Norway, Australia, and Switzerland among others. The package on implementation of Minsk agreements became a road map for peaceful settlement. We count among successes of the Ukrainian diplomacy the following: introduction of no-visa regime with the European Union and deepening cooperation with the NATO.

As a result, Ukraine strengthened its defense capacity. International pressure on the Russian Federation with the aim of implementation of all the demands was preserved. And all this achivments was carried out by Ukrainian diplomats.

References

1. Buzan, Barry (2018). *The evolution of international security studies* / Barry Buzan, Lene Hansen. 2018. URL: <https://ir101.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/buzan-the-evolution-of-international-security-studies-compressed.pdf> [in English].
2. Bruno Lete. (2016). *NATOs Enhanced Opportunities Partners* June 29, 2016. URL: <http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/06/29/natos-enhanced-opportunities-partners>. [in English].
3. Central Rada of the Ukrainian People's Republic: historic reference. NRL: <http://www.britannica.com/topic/> [in English].
4. Chekalenko, L.D. (2024). *The Goal of the Evil Empire is to Destroy of Ukraine*. *International independent scientific journal*. No. 61. 2024. P. 21-31. URL: <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10955779> [in English].
5. Chekalenko, Liudmyla D. (2023). *Antyhumanity policy of russian invaders on the ukrainian territory*. *University and War in Ukraine*. Red. by Kinga Anna Gajda (Volume editor), Alicja Z. Nowak (Volume editor). 284 Pages. *History & Political Science. Series: Polish Studies in Culture, Nations and Politics*. 2023. Volume 58. 19 c. 1, 2 d. Warszaw. Poland. P. 248-268 [in English].
6. Chekalenko, Liudmyla D. (2023). *From the Moskoviya state to today*. *European Political and Law Discourse*. 2023. Prague. Czech Republic. Volume 10. Issue 5. P. 12-21. DOI:

- 10.46340/eppd.2023.10.5. NRL: <https://eppd13.cz/wp-content/uploads/2023/2023-10-5/04.pdf> [in English].
7. Chekalenko, L.D. (2021). *Public History: Challenges of the 21st Century: [Publiczna istoriia: vyklyky 21 stolittia]*. Scientific Monograph. Kyiv, ArtEk Co., 272 p., ill. ISBN 978-617-8043-05-6. NRL: <https://ivinas.gov.ua/publikatsiji.html> [in Ukrainian].
8. Chekalenko, L. (2024). *Rosiiskyi syndrom samozberezhennia [Russian preservation syndrome]*. *Foreign Affairs*, 2024. 34(1), 12-16. DOI: 10.46493/2663-2675.34(1).2024.12. NRL: <https://uaforeignaffairs.com/uk/journal-item/136> [in Ukrainian].
9. Chekalenko Liudmyla D. (2020). *First Minister for Foreign Affairs of independent Ukraine*. *International independent scientific journal*. № 2. 2020. VOL. 1. P. 21-30. Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Poland. NRL: http://www.iis-journal.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/IISJ_12_1.pdf [in English].
10. Chekalenko Liudmyla D. (2016). *Foreign policy of Ukraine (monograph)*. Kyiv. LAT&K, 2016. 294 p., 8 p. pic. URL: <http://elibrary.ivinas.gov.ua/4235/1/ChekalenkoZL.D.ZForeignZ-policyZofZUkraine.pdf>. [in English].
- a. *Koruptsiia sto rokov tomu: yak obkradaly armiiu UNR i do choho tse pryzyvelo [Corruption a hundred years ago: how the UNR army was robbed and before]*. *Radio Liberty*. Mar. 23, 2019. URL: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/29838203.html> [in Ukrainian].
- b. Doroshko, M. (2016) "Hibrydna viina" Rosii proty Ukrainy: istoriko-politychne doslidzhennia [Russia's "Hybrid War" against Ukraine: a historical and political study]. 2016.184 p. Nika Center [in Ukrainian].
- c. Doroshko, M. (2024) *Rossyiskaia denatsifikatsiia Ukrainy: teoriia y henotsyd. [Russian «denazification» of Ukraine: the theory of genocide]*. *Law & Society* 9, 2024. P. 37-43. [in Ukrainian].
11. Doroshenko, D.I. (1992) *Narys istorii Ukrainy [Essay on the history of Ukraine]*. Tom II. Kyiv. Globus, 1992. S. 136–146 [in Ukrainian].
12. Feodorov, Ioana. (2012). *Ifranj, Ifranjiyy: what language was Paul of Aleppo referring to in his travel notes? Romano-Arabica XII*. 2012. P.105-116. NRL: http://www.academia.edu/13451106/Ifranj_Ifranjiyy_what_language_was_Paul_of_Aleppo_referring_to_in_his_travel_notes [in English].
13. Hrushevskiy M. (1904) *Zvychnaia skhema russkoi istorii y sprava ratsionalnogo ukladu istorii skhidnogo slovianstva. [The usual scheme of "Russian" history and the case of a rational structure of the history of Eastern Slavs]*. *Articles on Slavonic studies*. St. Petersburg, 1904. P. 299–300 [in Ukrainian].
14. *Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky – Hetman of the Ukrainian State*. NRL: <https://fashion-diplomacy.com/en/history/pavlo-skoropadsky-hetman-of-the-ukrainian-state/> [in English].
15. *Istoriia Ukrainy (1997) [History of Ukraine]: Textbook / Ed. Smolii, V.A.* Kyiv. Alternatives, 1997. [in Ukrainian].
16. *Istoriia i tradytsii zovnishnopolitychnoi sluzhby Ukrainy (2016). [History and traditions of the foreign policy service of Ukraine]*. NRL: <https://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-mfa/history> [in Ukrainian].
17. Khmelnytsky, Bohdan: *biography*. NRL: <http://www.britannica.com/biography/Bohdan-Khmelnytsky>. [in English].
18. Kapiika, V.V. (2012) *Ukraina – Yevropeiskyi Soiuz [Ukraine – European Union: economy, policy, right]*: monograph. Kyiv. 2012. 264 p. [in Ukrainian].
19. Koppel O.A., Parkhomchuk O.S. (2004) *Mizhnarodni systemy ta hlobalnyi rozvytok. [International Systems and Global Development]*. Kyiv, 2004. 320 p. [in Ukrainian].

20. Kovalchuk, M. (2017) *Konflikt z bilshovykamy buv neybezhen* [The conflict with the Bolsheviks was inevitable]. December 31, 2017, Radio Svoboda. URL: <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28946450.html> [in Ukrainian].
21. Krechethnikov, Artem. (2016) Karamzin, Nikolai. *History of the Russian state. – Nikolay Karamzin: From the Mason to the Conservative*. BBC Service. December 12, 2016. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/features-38030502> [in English].
22. Lipschutz, Ronnie D. (1995) *On Security*. The University of Utah. 250 p. URL: <http://ereserve.library.utah.edu › Lobell › security. PDF> [in English].
23. Lupandin, O.I. (2021) *Dyplomatychni misii, misii i konsulski ustanovy Ukrainskykh uriadiv 1917–1920. [Diplomatic Missions, Missions and Consular Institutions of Ukrainian Governments 1917–1920]*. URL: http://resource.history.org.ua/cgi-bin/eiu/history.exe?&I21DBN=EI-U&P21DBN=EIU.Dyplomatychnyctva_uryadiv [in Ukrainian].
24. Mérimée, Prosper. (1865) *Les Cosaques d'Autrefois*. Prosper Mérimée on Bohdan Khmelnytsky. URL: <http://halychyna.ca/Misc/merime01.html> [in English].
25. Papa, I.Yu. (2018) (Not) the daily life of the Danish diplomat in Russia (based on the travel diary of Ust Julia, 1709 – 1711). URL: <https://doi.org/10.18523/2617-3417.2018.3-10> [in English].
- a. Vidoma pisnia z nevidomoiu istoriiei. "Shchedryk", 2022. URL: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nF7rQl8j5uI> [in Ukrainian].
26. *Ukrainci vidmichaiut 15u richnytsiu vklbchennia Natsionalnoho Soboru Sofii Kyivskoi i Kyievo-Pecherskoi Lavry do spysku YuNESKO (2005) [Ukrainians celebrate 15th anniversary of including National Sanctuary Sophia Kyivska and Kiev-Pecherska Laura into UNESCO's heritage list]*. 13.12.2005. 09:48. Ukrinform. URL: https://www.kmu.gov.ua/control/publish/article?art_id=25774879 [in Ukrainian].
27. *Ukrainska dyplomatiia vidznachaie 100 richnytsiu (2014). [Ukrainian diplomacy marks 100th anniversary]*. Jan 22, 2014 08:42. URL: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2369547-ukrainska-diplomatia-vidznacae-100ricca.html> [in Ukrainian].
28. Waever, Ole. (2020). *Securitization and Desecuritization*. URL: <https://chuelesspolitical-scientist.wordpress.com/2020/08/05/securitization-desecuritization-ole-waever-a-summary/> [in English].