COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC MECHANISMS
OF CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATION OF *SACREDNESS*

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Summary

The aim of this paper is to investigate the cognitive peculiarities of the concept of *Sacredness* and the means of expressing the chosen concept in the novel of James Joyce *"The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man"*. Much attention has been paid to specific cognitive factors that account for the formation of occasion-bound meanings for effective communication and cooperation. The topicality of the paper coincides with studying and understanding the process of categorization and conceptualization of the world and with the analysis of textual communication. We should try to figure out what roles texts may fulfil, how they might be encoded or decoded, what people are using them for in a given set of occurrence, and so forth. The words and sentences on the page are reliable clues in accessing the entity of the concept of *Sacredness*. The methods of the research are as follows: the inductive-deductive method of analysis of language material; the method of the semantic modelling and contextual interpretational analysis; the method of the quantitative counting of received language empirical data. The Novelty of the paper is associated with increased interest in cognitive linguistics and cognitive semantics; the interaction of thought and language, with an attempt to understand how our speech is made, perceived, understood and interpreted.

Keywords: categorization, cognition, concept, pragmatics, communication, mentality, reference, semantic change.

1. Introduction

Cognitive processes play a great role in the actuation of semantic change when speakers modify conventional meanings by resorting to various cognitive mechanisms to meet changing communicative and cognitive needs. Such a perspective on semantic change appears to demonstrate that meaning can be affected by the subjectivity of the human mind, contrary to its traditional treatment by modern semantic theory as objective and invariable. There are some ways the term *concept* is understood. In our paper, we will try to discuss the philosophical, psychological, cognitive and linguistic points of view.

Our paper deals with the analysis of language as a means of the organization, processing and interoperating information with the emphasis on studying the chosen concept. A person, having comprehended some information and given it a name or definition, conceptualizes an event or phenomenon of the external world. The term *concept* may be defined as a complex of associations, comprising the certain mental area of the speaker. We would like to investigate how the efficiency principle is realized. More specifically, we are interested in the choice of a conventional expression for use in innovative ways for the sake of efficient communication and how it is implied in the literary text. However, we will try to go beyond the pure linguistic analysis of how new categories and concepts are named and look

at the cognitive processes in the mind of the individual speaker when facing communicative challenges.

As much as a change of meaning should be considered a semantic issue, the traditional semantic theory is not capable of explaining semantic change and even excludes it from its subject matter, although it should be considered one of the major tests of its validity *(Geeraets, 2007: 221)*. Lyle Campbell presents this situation in the following way that we would be in a better position to understand semantic change if we could base our understanding of change in meaning on a solid theory of semantics *(Campbell, 2007: 130)*.

In the following, we will first review some general issues of cognitive models of communication and then discuss the connection between pragmatic and semantic changes and cognition in general. We will try to examine how the actuation of semantic change originates in various cognitive mechanisms in the mind of the individual speaker to adapt the language to new circumstances in the form of novel expressions. Undoubtedly we will pay much attention to specific cognitive factors that guide the formation of occasion-bound meanings for efficient but economical reference and representation

2. Cognitive Models of Communication

The cognitive motivation for the innovative use of expressions will first lead to individual linguistic action, which will actuate semantic change only if such actions of language users are eventually summated. Both Keller and Raimo speak of language change as the collective consequence of an invisible hand process. Such a process occurs when individuals perform certain actions intentionally but not with the consequences that will nonetheless eventually be caused in mind *(Keller, 1994: 130; Raimo, 1989: 125)*. For instance, a beaten path across a lawn will ensue through individuals intentionally crossing the lawn although not having the purpose of creating such a path. The path originates as a non-intended collective consequence of the intentional individual actions. Language change is supposed to be a similar process. Within a formulation of the invisible hand explanation Keller includes the depiction of personal motives, intentions, goals, convictions, which form the basis of individual actions *(Keller, 1994: 151)*.

Gábor Györi thinks that an analysis of these motives does not provide a full explanation for the individual actions, i.e., the innovative usage of conventional expressions, but for a full understanding of semantic change, its cognitive background must also be uncovered *(Gábor, 2002: 151)*. The alteration in the usage of an expression across a speech community as a cumulative result of the communicative activity of its members can only indirectly be characterized as a cognitive phenomenon since the phase in which cognitive mechanisms and principles of categorization operate in the process of semantic change is obviously that of its actuation in the communicative activity of individual speakers. The effort to convey ideas appropriately and effectively may lead to the production of occasion-bound meanings in the language. In general, such new variants of meaning arise when speakers feel the need to refer to parts of reality for which no conventional name exists in the language or wish to express new ideas or views or emotional stances about or towards their environment and deem the available conventional expressions unsatisfactory for that purpose describes this situation as speakers possessing a "potential designatum" for which they need to find an adequate sign. In this way it is the individual speaker who actively (though not necessarily consciously) induces the change in an attempt to make his mental model of the world accessible to the hearer *(Geeraets, 2007: 150)*.

The communicative motives for inducing changes in meaning are quite obvious. Historical linguistics has offered plausible causal and theological explanations in the form of

intralinguistic and extralinguistic factors that are responsible for the speakers' linguistic behaviour when altering their usage of language and thereby actuating changes of meaning. In the case of external causes of change (e.g., historical, socio-cultural, etc.) the communicative reasons for the introduction of new meanings are self-evident, but intralinguistic causes also have essentially communication-related roots. Changes related to the elimination of homonymic clash, differentiation of synonyms, or chain shifts within lexical fields all stand in the service of making the language more efficient for communication. Even causes that have been described as psychological, such as 'boredom' with a word (for instance in the case of slang), allow the detection of communicative motives. Keller's communicative maxim *"Speak in such a way that people pay attention to you"* may definitely induce such changes *(Keller, 1994: 115)*.

Communicative efficiency motivates even such processes of semantic change as Grammaticalization and the development of discourse markers, etc. *(Arutyunova, 1990: 411)*.

In our paper, we will explore the practical appliance of the special characteristics of cognition that provide the motivational basis for the production and comprehension of semantic innovations and thus influence the way semantic change is designed. These are the characteristics that underlie the sharing of individual mental models in communicative interaction to produce culturally valid models of reality.

It has to be mentioned though that there are attested cases of semantic change in which only pure chance and no cognitive processes seem to play a role. McMahon mentions that the movement of the sense of flaunting towards that of 'flout' is an ongoing change in English *(McMahon, 2000: 154)*. It is indeed hard to see what cognitive motivation could underlie this semantic shift, and it may be a simple case of misinterpretation, probably caused by the similarity of the signifiers. As another famous example, the etymology of the word *bead* could be mentioned. One explanation claims that in this case, erroneous learning occurred between generations. Children may have misinterpreted the Old English word (*ge)bed* 'prayer' as meaning 'the little spheres on the rosary' when hearing the phrase to count one's prayers. On the other hand, Campbell interprets this change in meaning as a "metaphorical extension from the 'prayer', which was kept track of by the rosary bead, to the rosary bead itself" *(Campbell, 2007: 219)*. We think that the two views do not contradict each other, since erroneous learning through misinterpretation is undoubtedly a cognitive act that should involve some standard cognitive mechanism, though wrongly applied.

Another rather common case of semantic change in which one might suspect the lack of cognitive motivation is when there is a change in the referent of a word. After all, it indeed seems to be true here those speakers' cognitive processes do not have anything to do with the change. As an example of referent change, Raimo Anttila mentions English *pen* which used to mean 'feather' and was an appropriate term "when quills were used for writing with ink" *(Raimo, 1989: 144)*. As a consequence of the change in material culture, *pen,* today means 'writing tool'.

A demonstration of the fact that various cognitive factors guide semantic innovation will also cast doubt on the objectivist stance described in the foregoing and strengthen the recent view in semantics that meaning is based on the human understanding of the world and consists of knowledge structures that are open-ended and encyclopedic in nature. If this turns out to be a valid property of meaning, then it will also become obvious that change is a necessary and natural characteristic of meaning, or, in Mc Mahon's even stronger formulation: *"the nature of meaning is change"* *(McMahon, 2000: 57)*.

This type of cognitive semantics also holds that semantic structure is shaped by the characteristics of human cognitive abilities, as opposed to the mentalist-rationalist view according

to which it matches reality in an objective way independent of how language users happen to see the world and others have shown how metaphorical and metonymical processes, image schematic projections, idealized cognitive models, etc., help us understand and interpret the world around us. It is no wonder then that this leaves its mark on the language and will fossilize as diachronic semantic phenomena. In line with these views, several recent works on semantic change take a cognitive approach for granted *(Aarts et al., 2006: 210)*.

Every national linguistic science has specific attitudes towards cognitive linguistics and cognitive semantics in particular. Nowadays this enterprise is very popular in Ukraine. The Ukrainian cognitive research is developing alongside the European one. Such prominent Ukrainian cognitive linguist as Kononenko deals with the problems of conceptual analysis *(Kononenko, 2004: 12)*. Russian cognitive linguists view the concept as a unit of the mental lexicon *(Kubriyakova, 1995: 151–154)*.

From a philosophical point of view, a concept is a unit of thoughts consisting of two parts, the extension and the intension. The extension covers all objects belonging to this concept, and the intention comprises all attributes valid for all those objects. Hence, objects and attributes play a prominent role together with several relations, like, e.g., the hierarchical "sub concept – super concept" relations between concepts, the implication between attributes, and the incidence relation *"an object has an attribute"* e.g., the birds of prey describe a sub concept of the concept birds. The extent of this sub concept consists only of the eagle, the intent consists of the two attributes preying and bird *(Kubriyakova, 1995: 177)*. That is why we consider analyzing different contexts of word usage and their correspondence to the dictionary entries of the word in question. Frequent and wide usage of definite context demanding the definite meaning makes the latter enter the definition of the word as a conventional meaning. It is also the reason for the dictionaries to present example sentences to clarify and justify the meaning explained.

3. Cognitive peculiarities of the concept of *Sacredness*

A model with social character is known to be superior to an individual one inaccuracy, flexibility and range. The linguistic model of the word forms a type of relation of Man to the world. Basic categories building the model (time, space, change, cause, number) precede the ideas and outlooks. Philosophy discloses the objective reality of the world and existence of Man richness of human feelings and plays a great role in the conscious determination of relationships of Man with Nature. Linguistic world image is a mode of reflection of reality in the consciousness of human being: it means perception of this reality through the prism of linguistic, cultural and national peculiarities; peculiar to a certain linguistic group of people; it is an interpretation of the other world while following the national conceptual and structural cannons.

The concept of cooperative communication involves an idealization that is not simply inherited from a methodological tradition in linguistics but primarily from our understanding of the concept of communication itself. In at least the Western cultural tradition, communication has a positive connotation in that it is believed to achieve a state that favourably affects human life. We often talk about successful communication, communication between generations as values in themselves. We seek to improved communication between people and nations, while situation leading to unpleasant consequences are attributed to lack of communication *(Deik, 1989: 146)*. People are often accused of not being communicative if they cannot express themselves adequately. Even language teaching in the last few decades, and second language, in particular, have been oriented towards developing communicative abilities or skills. In many academic establishments communication studies are prioritized, while mass and electronic

media have pronounced communication their ultimate goal. It is probably this positive connotation of communication that links to the concept of cooperation, even though it is clear that communication does not always achieve cooperation.

The idealized cognitive model of communication involves the intentional, effortless and cooperative transfer of ideas, thoughts and feelings between a speaker and addressee through a shared medium and to mutual benefit. As already mentioned, this model is highly culture-specific and it could not have been otherwise. It will be assumed that it essentially concerns the way we understand linguistic communication, but it may also apply to non-linguistic communication with slight alterations (e.g. concerning participant roles) that do not affect its idealized nature *(Evans et al., 2006: 103–105)*.

Joyce's narrative simplicity is that powerful instrument with the help of which he shows reality and non-reality. The author mastered this technique over the years. The language of his work is simple, though he uses complex allegories, metaphors, and idioms. His message is also very simple and millennial: happiness is in us.

Concerning Stephen's eventual development of a theory of art or an aesthetic theory, he fully draws on this tradition. He uses two central doctrines of the church in this theory. First, he revises the doctrine into a way of imagining the relationship between art and the world it describes. When Stephen develops his theory, he thinks of himself as taking on the role of a *"priest of eternal imagination, transmuting the daily bread of experience into the radiant body of ever living life."* The second use of Catholic doctrine or tradition relates to its creation of priesthood, a class of men separate from the world who act as intermediaries between the Deity and the people. In Stephen's idea of the artist, he is priest-like, performing the miracle of turning life into art.

One of the most important and necessary parts of the creative process of the human is acquiring knowledge: *"... he knew of more ways of extortion than I could tell in two years" (Joyce, 1996: 28). "He would rather have had at his bed's head twenty volumes of Aristotle and his philosophy, bound in red or black, than rich robes or a fiddle or gay psaltery (Joyce, 1996: 36). "Gladly would he learn and gladly would he teach" (Joyce, 1996: 52)*.

Faith is the principal phenomenon of the concept of *Sacredness*. As a part of the whole, *faith* stands for the universal power against the whole world. *Faith* is the whole that serves for the part of this world, for the person. So, the person, and especially his heart is that container for the content *"faith"* that struggles for eternal ideas of good and justice. But *faith* is not separated from the world, it exists in this world and the place for its fighting is the world itself. And the exact place for this struggle we find in the human's heart. The results of this invisible fighting could be controlled by the human's heart only, whether it fails or wins. So the *faith* causes the effect of never-ending struggle and keeps the hope in a person's power alive. It is emphasized by the contextual contradiction *"faith and the whole world"*. The Longman Dictionary gives the following definition of 'faith': *strong belief; (loyalty to one's) word of honour; promise; (a system of) religious belief, religion (Longman, 1992: 214)*.

The author expresses his own attitude to the category *"faith"* in the following lines: *"He was a faithful and a good toiler, living in peace and perfect charity" (Joyce, 1996: 34). "An evil-doer should not hope for good deeds" (Joyce, 1996: 126)*.

We can find many expressions, which emphasize the author religious belief. For example: *"Many of people are so stern of heart that they cannot weep, though they suffer sorely; therefore, instead of weeping and praying, men may give silver to the poor friars" (Joyce, 1996: 19). ". a good man of religion, a poor Parson, but rich in holy thought and deed" (Joyce, 1996: 54). "May Jesus Christ bless you, and all his handiwork, great and small!" (Joyce, 1996: 34)*.

"Pray you all not to take it badly, though I may make a fool of him" (Joyce, 1996: 46). "I pray to God, may his neck break! He can well see a stick a sliver in my eye, but cannot see a beam of wood in his own" (Joyce, 1996: 75). "Madame, may God give you joy!" (Joyce, 1996: 98).

Let us clear up another category of the concept of *Sacredness,* i.e. *friendship.* It is also, without any doubt the universal phenomenon that appears between people and is something that everyone subconsciously gets as *sacred.* The Longman Dictionary defines *friendship* in such a way: *friendship* (an example of) the condition of sharing a friendly relationship; feeling and behaviour that exists between friends; true friendship is worth more than money *(Longman, 1992: 245).*

As part of the whole *friendship,* it is a certain state which can appear in the relationship between people. On the other hand, it is the whole that should combine certain qualities of the attitude of one person towards the other, so that it could be named as *"friendship".* The category of *friendship* contains positive content, and brings the understanding of the *sacred* of this phenomenon depends on a person's personal features. The essence of *friendship* could contain only good, to some extent only sacred things; we understand under the good things something that brings the person the good. We may also say that a person could be a friend or an enemy to himself personally. Then we speak about the place for the existence of this category, if it concerns one person only and his or her attitude towards himself/herself, then the place for such a category will be in human's mind and heart. But if *friendship* is the act of a relationship between more than one member, it will find its place in the social understanding of this category. *Friendship* is controlled by the inner state of the human's mind; the person's feelings control the existence of *friendship.* Subconsciously the person defines the social circle which is friendly for him.

The human being is such a creature that being influenced by the inner world could create the own image of things. When things don't go as the person wishes, he or she begins to dream of possible ways of going on things. So we speak about the *dream,* the other category of the concept of *Sacredness* that creates only positive images in the human's mind. When we hear the word *"dream"* in our mind appears the feeling of something pleasant and sacred but unreal, something that will never come true, wished but unrealizable.

The Longman Dictionary gives the following definition of the word *"dream"*: dream 1) a group of thoughts, images, or feelings experienced during sleep or when the mind is not completely under conscious control; 2) a state of mind in which one doesn't pay much attention to the real world; 3) something imagined and hopefully desired; 4) a thing or person notable for beauty, excellence, or enjoyable quality *(Longman, 1992: 184).*

As the container of the good context *dream* is one of the most unique categories that absolutely is understood by everybody as the bringer of positive emotions and thoughts, which are usually mixed up with the feeling of never coming true. *"... trust were to befoul, it is no wonder that an ignorant layman would be corrupt…" (Joyce, 1996: 49). "... may they come to the best of bad ends!" (Joyce, 1996: 56). "... in his house, it snowed meat and drink, and every fine pleasure that a man could dream of" (Joyce, 1996: 66).*

By reading James Joyce's novel, we get a clue that there are two reasons that would not let our dreams come true. In most cases, they seem to be unreal, and sometimes as a result of sudden change, people understand that the *dream* is possible, when you are not waiting for its successful fulfilling. So the positive category of the *dream* always goes along with the negative category of *fear*. If we consult the Longman Dictionary we will find the following notes, written about the word "fear": *fear* 1) the feeling that one has when danger is near; the feeling that something (usu. unpleasant) is likely to happen: I couldn't move

for (=because of) fear; 2) No fear! (in answer to a suggestion that one should do something *(Longman, 1992: 220)*.

Fear by nature is something bad, or something that causes bad feelings, that influence the person's life on the subconscious level. The category of *fear* however is written in human's life and exists in it. It depends on the person himself, on the strength of his character, how deep this feeling is. Speaking about *"A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man",* we find the arguments that prove that the category is universal and without any exclusion is natural for a man.

According to causes of the change, this is external, historical, social, cultural, and technological; it doesn't depend on the kind of society or the nation. Such factors cause only the degree of the *fear* but the *fear* itself is an overwhelming psychological category as a whole, which in the novel by James Joyce is depicted with exaggeration, emphasis and expressiveness. This is at the same time the part of human's unhappiness and a source of bad thoughts and evil emotions. The place for its effect is in the human's mind and it causes the feeling of despair. This category is shown with great tension. For example: *"...every guilty man should fear the church's curse, for it will slay, just as absolution saves, and also let him beware of significance…" (Joyce, 1996: 45)*. *"May Saint Antony's fire fall on their bodies!" (Joyce, 1996: 87)*. *"… began to cry aloud and was nearly mad; for she knew not what it signified, but only called out for fear and so wept that it was pitiful to listen…" (Joyce, 1996: 89)*.

And when the person overcomes his *fear,* at last, the *struggle* begins. The *struggle* is in the human's soul which later displays in the external acts. While hearing the word *struggle* we imagine coming through difficulties and fighting against somebody (something) for something. Let's see how the Dictionary interprets the word *struggle*: *struggle* – to make violent movements, esp. when fighting against a person or thing; the *struggle* is a hard inner fight or bodily effort *(Longman, 1992: 607)*.

Though the meaning of the word *"struggle"* may be associated with something bad, in the author's understanding, it is the process necessary for people to better understanding them. The *struggle* has no restriction; it is external as well as internal category. The author makes stronger ascent on the inner world struggle: he means the struggle in the heart and soul of the person: *"He was as if I shall give him a full praise, a thief and a summoned, and a pimp" (Joyce, 1996: 65)*.

This is the *struggle* between love and hate, charity and miserliness, honesty and falsehood, and it is endless. Considering this we can see that inner struggle displays in external human's deeds and has a great influence on life.

That's why that category *struggle* is closely connected with the category *life:* life 1) the action force that enables (animals and plants) to continue existing; 2) living things; 3) human existence; 4) the period during which one is alive; 5) a person: several lives were lost (=people died) in the accident. 6) activity; movement; 7) a person or thing that is the cause of enjoyment or activity in a group; 8) also life imprisoned; 9) also life – a written, filmed or another account of a person's existence; 10) not on your life! 11) Take one's (own)/someone's life to kill oneself/ someone *(Longman, 1992: 348)*.

In his *"A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man",* Joyce expresses his thoughts about uselessness and complexity of his own life*: "… a long span of youth after it first begins to spring, and, as we may see, has so long a life, yet at last it wastes away " (Joyce, 1996: 76)*. *"Men should wed accordingly to their own station in life, for youth and age are often at odds" (Joyce, 1996: 89)*.

But *life* is the category that goes side by side with the category of *death:* death 1) the end of life; time or manner of dying; 2) the end or destruction (of something not alive): a defeat that

meant death of all my hopes. 3) put to death to kill, esp. with official permission; 5) to death beyond all acceptable limits *(Longman, 1992: 173)*.

In his works, the author often resorts to such category as *death,* for example: *"I am dying in my own death and the deaths of those after me" (Joyce, 1996: 57). "I know the voices dying with a dying fall…" (Joyce, 1996: 99).* James Joyce pondered over this phenomenon, the place it in human's life and it displays in the following words*: "Man may die of imagination, so deep may the impression be" (Joyce, 1996: 121). "…even if we die by torture, shall either of us hinder the other in love or any case…" (Joyce, 1996: 76).*

Death, as a whole, is the category of evil. That is the container of bad emotions that appears in one's mind while hearing the word *"death".* The same we can notice in the author's understanding, *death* is a terrible phenomenon; it is the end of human's being: *"… death is an end to every pain and grief in this world" (Joyce, 1996: 154). "With that word his speech began to fail, for from his feet up to his breast had crept the cold of death that had vanquished him; and in his arms likewise the vital strength was lost and entirely gone " (Joyce, 1996: 118).*

But, at the same time, he interprets *death* (the end) as the beginning, beginning of the other form of human's being. *"Death drew out the tap of life and let it run" (Joyce, 1996: 88). "He cannot flee it [love], even if he should die, whether she is a maiden, married, or widow" (Joyce, 1996: 114).* Maybe, James Joyce's religious belief served as a base of such understanding and interpretation of this category. We can find the confirmation of this thought in the following lines: *"Well has Fortune cast the die for you, who have the sight of her, as I only have the absence!" (Joyce, 1996: 123).* For James Joyce *death* is closely connected with such a category as *birth. "Here comes my mortal foe; without fail, either he or I must die …" (Joyce, 1996: 144).*

Death is the end and *birth* is the beginning, and as was said before, James Joyce considered the end to be the beginning and vice versa. In his *"A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,"* James Joyce wrote about the *death* of such important things for human's being as air, earth, water and fire. To our mind, a person can write such statements only when he had lost his hope. Only this feeling (*hope*) keeps us alive, helps us to feel happiness and comfort in life, but as we see, the author didn't feel these any more.

Let's consider the category *hope* as it is connected with the categories *life* and *death.* The human's mind is supported by *hope* and when people lose it, comes *death,* either physical or spiritual. *Hope* 1) the expectation of something, happening as one wishes; 2) a person, or a thing that seems likely to bring success; 3) hold out hope to give reason to expect; 4) raise someone's hopes to make someone hope for success, esp. when it is unlikely *(Longman, 1992: 294). "But I who am exiled and so barren of all grace and hope that neither earth, water, fire nor air, nor any creature made of them, can help or give me comfort, well may I die in distress and despair!" (Joyce, 1996: 67).* In the human's mind, *hope* is something positive. We are different; some people hope for something, some do not. It depends on a person; anyway, *hope* plays a great role in our life.

4. Conclusions

So, we may conclude that James Joyce's understanding of *Sacredness* makes the reader think over it. Everything has its double nature and we always have a chance to consider what *Sacredness* is for us. When new ideas are expressed in terms of familiar information, then both the new knowledge is conveyed and desirable intelligibility is achieved.

We have presented the main types of conceptual analysis, namely content analysis, formal concept analysis, conceptual modelling. We consider that the combination of the formal concept analysis and the internal conceptual analysis could reveal the entity of the concept deeper and more thoroughly. Hence the analyst is to consider both the contents of the concept and its synonyms, forming the hierarchical system. The central item of the system is the analyzed concept. The other elements are systemized according to their relations with the concept in question.

It follows from the functionality involved in the urge to comply with communicative challenges that neither the actuation of semantic change in the synchronic communicative-cognitive interaction between interlocutors nor its spread as the diachronic conventionalization process in the speech community is explicable without reference to usage. On the one hand, a language that is not used does not change and on the other, the only tangible sign of change is that a language has come to be used differently by its speakers over time.

Thus we have tried to show how semantic change is connected with the cognitive and pragmatic processes in the minds of individual speakers. Cognitive processes play a role in the actuation of semantic change when speakers modify conventional meanings by resorting to various cognitive mechanisms in order to meet changes in communicative and cognitive needs.

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