LEGAL STATUS OF AN «E-PERSON»: FROM A BINARY OPPOSITION TO A MODULAR APPROACH

Abstract

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) challenges traditional legal frameworks, particularly concerning liability. The European Parliament's 2017 proposal to create a legal status of an "electronic person" for sophisticated autonomous systems ignited a critical debate on whether machines can or should be granted legal personality. This article scrutinizes this controversial concept. Purpose. The study aims to critically analyze the "e-personhood" proposal, highlight its fundamental flaws, and introduce a more viable alternative framework for conceptualizing the legal status of AI. Methods. The research methodology includes a comparative legal analysis of key EU documents, such as the European Parliament's Resolution and reports from the EESC and AI HLEG, alongside a review of influential scholarly publications in the field of law and AI ethics. Results. The analysis concludes that granting legal personality to AI is a flawed approach that creates a dangerous "responsibility gap" and is ethically questionable. The study finds that existing legal instruments, such as strict product liability and insurance schemes, can be adapted to address damages caused by AI more effectively. Conclusion. The binary "person-or-thing" approach is insufficient for regulating AI. This article puts forward a novel hypothesis of a "modular approach" to AI's legal status. Instead of full personhood, this framework suggests endowing AI systems with specific, limited "modules" of legal capacity tailored to their function and autonomy. This pragmatic model ensures compensation for victims while firmly anchoring ultimate legal responsibility with human developers, manufacturers, and operators.