HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING OF EXERCISES WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES OF UKRAINE (DECEMBER 1991–FEBRUARY 2022)
Abstract
The article examines the historical aspects of organisational learning of military exercises within the Ukrainian Armed Forces (from their creation in December 1991 until the largescale Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022). It compares this activity with the relevant practice of the North Atlantic Alliance. The research paper highlights two key stages in the operational and combat training of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: “Decline” (December 1991–April 2014), when the military learning was ineffective, which impacted the ability of Ukrainian troops to adapt and functionally counter Russian armed aggression, and ‘Modernization’ (April 2014–February 2022), during which the approaches to analyse and implement lessons were improved by the NATO standards. A comparative analysis of the organisational learning of military exercises within the Armed Forces of Ukraine and NATO during the above period (1991–2022) was carried out on the basis of studying five key elements of the lessons learned capability: organisational structure, process, tools, training, and information sharing.
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